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With	  the	  entering	  into	  force	  of	  the	  European	  Directive	  96/82/EG	  (Seveso	  II	  
Directive)	  the	  Member	  States	  are	  required	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  operator	  of	  
an	  establishment	  falling	  under	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  Directive	  draws	  up	  
a	  policy	  for	  the	  prevention	  of	  major	  accidents.	  This	  policy	  shall	  be	  
designed	  to	  guarantee	  a	  high	  level	  of	  protection	  for	  man	  and	  the	  
environment.	  
For	  so	  called	  “lower-­‐tier”	  establishments	  this	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  the	  
drawing	  up	  of	  a	  “Major	  Accident	  Prevention	  Policy	  –	  MAPP”	  according	  to	  
the	  requirements	  of	  Article	  7	  of	  the	  directive.	  This	  document	  should	  take	  
account	  of	  the	  principles	  contained	  in	  Annex	  III.	  For	  the	  so	  called	  “upper-­‐
tier”	  establishments	  the	  operator	  must	  draw	  up	  a	  major	  accident	  
prevention	  policy	  and	  a	  safety	  management	  system	  (SMS)	  for	  
implementing	  it.	  Within	  the	  Safety	  Report	  (Art.	  9)	  it	  should	  be	  
demonstrated	  that	  the	  MAPP	  and	  the	  SMS	  have	  been	  put	  into	  effect	  in	  
accordance	  with	  Annex	  III.	  	  
However,	  there	  are	  still	  widespread	  questions	  as	  to	  when	  the	  assessment	  
of	  the	  SMS	  by	  the	  competent	  authorities	  within	  the	  inspection	  process	  
can	  determine	  that	  adequate	  steps	  have	  been	  taken,	  at	  what	  point	  can	  
the	  demonstration	  by	  the	  operator	  be	  considered	  sufficient,	  and	  how	  can	  
inspectors	  document	  their	  evidence	  of	  deficiencies	  in	  the	  SMS	  in	  such	  a	  
way	  as	  to	  be	  able	  to	  derive	  effective	  enforcement	  measures	  from	  this?	  	  
There	  is	  therefore	  a	  need	  to	  share	  experience	  and	  define	  the	  areas	  of	  
common	  understanding	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  inspection	  and	  control	  of	  
Safety	  Management	  Systems,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  areas	  where	  further	  work	  is	  
needed.	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  this	  topic	  was	  selected	  as	  the	  focus	  of	  a	  
workshop	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  European	  Commission’s	  Mutual	  Joint	  
Visit	  (MJV)	  Workshops	  for	  Seveso	  Inspections.	  	  The	  workshop	  results	  go	  
some	  way	  towards	  showing	  that	  common	  understandings	  can	  be	  




The	  MJV	  programme	  promotes	  technical	  exchange	  on	  common	  priority	  
topics	  among	  Seveso	  inspectors	  to	  facilitate	  the	  sharing	  and	  adoption	  of	  
good	  practices	  for	  enforcement	  and	  risk	  management.	  	  Results	  are	  
disseminated	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Seveso	  Inspections	  Publication	  Series	  with	  the	  
view	  that	  they	  may	  be	  of	  value	  to	  practitioners	  in	  both	  government	  and	  
industry.	  	  The	  programme	  is	  one	  of	  a	  number	  of	  initiatives	  currently	  
sponsored	  by	  the	  European	  Commission	  in	  place	  to	  support	  
implementation	  of	  the	  Directive.	  	  It	  is	  co-­‐ordinated	  with	  representatives	  
of	  Member	  States	  inspectorates	  and	  the	  European	  Process	  Safety	  Centre.	  
The	  main	  purpose	  of	  publishing	  this	  document	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  collection	  of	  
knowledge	  representing	  the	  state	  of	  practice	  in	  the	  EU	  in	  the	  expectation	  
that	  it	  will	  aid	  Seveso	  inspectors	  and	  inspections	  programmes	  in	  reviewing	  
and	  improving	  their	  performance	  as	  appropriate.	  It	  is	  understood	  that	  
several	  approaches	  to	  controlling	  this	  type	  of	  major	  hazard	  may	  be	  
equally	  effective	  and	  the	  document	  is	  not	  offered	  as	  a	  definitive	  
assessment	  of	  all	  possible	  options	  in	  this	  regard.	  Moreover,	  the	  authors	  
note	  that	  where	  information	  is	  provided	  on	  a	  practice	  applied	  in	  a	  
particular	  country	  it	  has	  been	  provided	  with	  the	  view	  that	  this	  might	  be	  
useful	  descriptive	  information.	  However,	  the	  document	  does	  not	  intend	  
to	  represent	  a	  complete	  description	  of	  any	  one	  country’s	  inspection	  
practices	  since	  they	  often	  differ	  internally	  between	  regions	  and	  
sometimes	  between	  competent	  authorities	  who	  share	  Seveso	  inspection	  
responsibilities.	  	  
	  
For	  more	  information	  on	  Seveso	  Directive	  implementation	  in	  the	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The	  safety	  management	  system	  is	  now	  considered	  a	  central	  component	  
of	  modern	  process	  safety	  management.	  	  It	  was	  first	  adopted	  into	  
various	  European	  national	  laws	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  most	  notably	  in	  the	  
United	  Kingdom	  for	  offshore	  facilities	  following	  the	  1988	  Piper	  Alpha	  
disaster	  in	  the	  North	  Sea.	  	  With	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  Seveso	  II	  Directive	  in	  
1996	  (Directive	  96/82/EC),	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  safety	  management	  
system	  was	  enshrined	  as	  an	  essential	  element	  in	  control	  of	  sites	  with	  
major	  chemical	  hazards	  across	  the	  European	  Union.	  	  The	  Cullen	  Report	  
that	  was	  issued	  following	  the	  Piper	  Alpha	  disaster	  also	  introduced	  the	  
operator	  obligation	  to	  “demonstrate”	  that	  it	  has	  a	  safety	  management	  
system	  and	  recommended	  that	  regulators	  employ	  a	  systematic	  
approach	  to	  inspections	  that	  was	  equally	  focused	  on	  compliance	  with	  
safety	  management	  criteria	  as	  well	  as	  technical	  standards.	  [1]Error!	  
Reference	  source	  not	  found.	  
With	  the	  entering	  into	  force	  of	  the	  Seveso	  II	  Directive1,	  the	  Member	  
States	  have	  ever	  since	  been	  required	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  operator	  of	  an	  
establishment	  falling	  under	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  Directive	  draws	  up	  
a	  policy	  for	  the	  prevention	  of	  major	  accidents.	  This	  policy	  shall	  be	  
designed	  to	  guarantee	  a	  high	  level	  of	  protection	  for	  man	  and	  the	  
environment.	  	  For	  lower-­‐tier	  establishments	  this	  requirement	  is	  
manifested	  in	  the	  obligation	  to	  establish	  a	  major	  accident	  prevention	  
policy	  (MAPP)	  under	  Article	  7	  of	  the	  Directive.	  This	  document	  should	  
take	  account	  of	  the	  principles	  contained	  in	  Annex	  III.	  	  For	  upper-­‐tier	  
establishments	  the	  operator	  must	  establish	  both	  a	  major	  accident	  
prevention	  policy	  and	  a	  safety	  management	  system	  (SMS)	  for	  
implementing	  it.	  	  According	  to	  Article	  9	  of	  the	  Directive,	  the	  operator	  
must	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  MAPP	  and	  the	  SMS	  have	  been	  put	  into	  
effect	  consistent	  with	  the	  principles	  articulated	  in	  Annex	  III.	  	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Obligations	  associated	  with	  safety	  management	  systems	  are	  
continued	  in	  Seveso	  III	  (2012/18/EU),	  but	  since	  the	  workshop	  took	  place	  
prior	  to	  Seveso	  III	  	  coming	  into	  effect,	  the	  reference	  legislation	  of	  the	  
document	  remains	  Seveso	  II.	  	  




Directive	  also	  clearly	  states	  that	  the	  level	  of	  complexity	  and	  detail	  of	  the	  
safety	  management	  system	  should	  be	  in	  proportion	  to	  the	  level	  of	  risk	  
present	  on	  the	  site.	  
Article	  18	  of	  the	  Directive	  requires	  conducting	  a	  systematic	  examination	  
of	  the	  systems	  being	  employed	  at	  the	  establishment,	  whether	  of	  a	  
technical,	  organizational	  or	  managerial	  nature,	  so	  as	  to	  ensure	  in	  
particular:	  
• That	  the	  operator	  can	  demonstrate	  that	  he	  has	  taken	  
appropriate	  measures,	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  various	  activities	  
involved	  in	  the	  establishment,	  to	  prevent	  major-­‐accidents,	  	  
• That	  the	  operator	  can	  demonstrate	  that	  he	  has	  provided	  
appropriate	  means	  for	  limiting	  the	  consequences	  of	  major-­‐
accidents,	  on-­‐site	  and	  off-­‐site,	  	  
• That	  the	  data	  and	  information	  contained	  in	  the	  safety	  report,	  
or	  any	  other	  report	  submitted,	  adequately	  reflects	  the	  
conditions	  in	  the	  establishment	  	  
• That	  information	  has	  been	  supplied	  to	  the	  public	  pursuant	  to	  
Article	  13.	  
Public	  authorities	  are	  required	  to	  carry	  out	  inspections	  of	  the	  
establishments	  which	  cover	  not	  only	  aspects	  of	  the	  technical	  but	  also	  
organizational	  and	  managerial	  systems.	  	  
There	  are	  still	  widespread	  questions	  among	  many	  inspectors	  as	  to	  when	  
the	  assessment	  of	  the	  SMS	  can	  determine	  that	  adequate	  steps	  have	  
been	  taken,	  in	  particular:	  
• At	  what	  point,	  can	  the	  demonstration	  by	  the	  operator	  be	  
considered	  sufficient?	  
• How	  can	  inspectors	  document	  their	  evidence	  of	  deficiencies	  in	  
the	  SMS	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  be	  able	  to	  derive	  effective	  
enforcement	  measures	  from	  this?	  	  	  
The	  problem	  of	  evaluating	  the	  SMS	  has	  several	  dimensions.	  	  The	  safety	  
report	  does	  not	  always	  create	  a	  narrative	  that	  is	  sufficiently	  transparent	  




in	  connecting	  major	  accident	  risks	  to	  the	  safety	  management	  system	  
and	  relevant	  control	  measures.	  	  Large	  scale	  enterprises	  and	  
corporations	  belonging	  to	  the	  upper-­‐tier	  establishments	  of	  the	  Seveso	  II	  
Directive	  may	  have	  a	  number	  of	  different	  certifications	  under	  quality,	  
occupational	  health	  and	  safety,	  or	  environmental	  management	  
standards.	  	  In	  this	  type	  of	  facility	  it	  is	  often	  difficult	  to	  assess	  how	  safety	  
specifically	  with	  regard	  to	  major	  accident	  prevention	  is	  addressed.	  Small	  
and	  medium-­‐size	  enterprises	  often	  have	  limited	  resources	  and	  expertise	  
for	  understanding	  what	  SMS	  processes	  they	  need	  so	  to	  establish	  and	  
maintain	  an	  SMS	  appropriate	  to	  their	  risks.	  	  	  In	  some	  industries	  the	  
operators	  have	  only	  a	  little	  knowledge	  of	  the	  regulations	  relating	  to	  
major	  accidents	  making	  communication	  between	  authorities	  and	  
operators	  about	  the	  SMS	  even	  more	  difficult.	  
It	  is	  clear	  that	  there	  is	  no	  simple	  formula	  for	  responding	  to	  these	  
challenges	  that	  applies	  individually	  to	  each	  site.	  	  However,	  the	  
systematic	  nature	  of	  an	  audit	  implies	  a	  common	  logic	  that	  should	  be	  
applied	  systematically	  across	  sites.	  	  	  However,	  even	  when	  a	  logical	  audit	  
system	  has	  been	  well-­‐defined	  by	  authorities,	  substantial	  questions	  
remain	  concerning	  how	  far	  to	  carry	  the	  logic,	  how	  to	  recognize	  where	  
important	  gaps	  are	  present,	  how	  to	  be	  confident	  that	  implementation	  
in	  practice	  with	  management	  claims,	  etc.	  	  
For	  this	  reason,	  it	  was	  recognized	  that	  sharing	  knowledge	  and	  
experience	  among	  inspectors	  could	  be	  very	  useful	  for	  benchmarking	  
good	  practice	  on	  inspection	  and	  control	  of	  SMS	  demonstrations.	  	  In	  
addition,	  this	  exchange	  would	  be	  of	  value	  to	  identify	  common	  priorities	  
for	  further	  development	  of	  knowledge	  and	  tools	  to	  aid	  inspectors	  in	  
these	  efforts.	  
From	  27-­‐29	  October	  2010,	  the	  Regional	  Council	  of	  Darmstadt	  hosted	  a	  
Mutual	  Joint	  Visit	  (MJV)	  workshop	  for	  Seveso	  Inspectors	  in	  Fulda,	  
Germany	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  Safety	  Management	  Systems.	  	  	  Workshop	  
participants	  consisted	  of	  33	  participants	  from	  inspection	  authorities	  
from	  17	  EU	  Member	  States,	  2	  Candidate	  Countries	  and	  2	  countries	  of	  
the	  European	  Economic	  Area.	  	  In	  addition	  a	  number	  of	  representatives	  
from	  industry	  participated.	  




The	  workshops	  each	  addressed	  a	  different	  SMS	  topic.	  	  For	  reasons	  of	  
time,	  the	  third	  element	  (Operating	  Procedures)	  and	  fifth	  element	  
(Planning	  for	  Emergencies)	  of	  the	  SMS,	  as	  defined	  in	  Annex	  III	  of	  the	  
Seveso	  Directive,	  were	  not	  discussed.	  	  The	  remaining	  SMS	  elements	  
were	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  workshops	  as	  indicated	  below:	  
• Workshop	  I:	  Organization	  and	  Personnel	  	  
• Workshop	  II:	  Identification	  and	  Evaluation	  of	  Major	  Hazards	  
and	  Risks	  
• Workshop	  III:	  Management	  of	  Change	  
• Workshop	  IV:	  Monitoring	  Performance,	  Audit	  and	  Review	  
	  
Participants	  were	  allocated	  to	  one	  of	  the	  3	  parallel	  break-­‐out	  groups,	  
focused	  on	  a	  different	  type	  of	  operator,	  as	  described	  above,	  but	  the	  
same	  SMS	  inspection	  topic.	  	  Each	  workshop	  concluded	  with	  a	  plenary	  
session	  in	  which	  the	  groups	  came	  together	  to	  share	  their	  results.	  For	  
each	  plenary	  session	  rapporteurs	  noted	  the	  contents,	  
recommendations	  and	  conclusions	  of	  the	  discussions	  and	  in	  the	  final	  
session	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  workshop	  the	  compiled	  results	  were	  
presented	  for	  a	  final	  discussion.	  The	  discussions,	  their	  results	  together	  
with	  the	  introductory	  presentations	  generated	  the	  basis	  for	  this	  
publication.	  	  
 
GENERAL	  OVERVIEW	  OF	  THE	  ASSESSMENT	  OF	  THE	  SMS	  	  
A	  large	  proportion	  of	  the	  inspection	  activities	  to-­‐date	  have	  
concentrated	  on	  determining	  whether	  or	  not	  procedures	  have	  been	  
implemented	  and	  whether	  responsibilities	  have	  been	  adequately	  
defined.	  A	  number	  of	  check-­‐list	  and	  questionnaires	  exist	  to	  assist	  the	  
inspectors	  in	  this	  task.	  	  When	  inspecting	  the	  SMS	  the	  authority	  
inspectors	  need	  to	  be	  aware	  that	  each	  company	  will	  have	  its	  own	  
individual	  design.	  	  Assessment	  of	  the	  SMS	  within	  the	  inspection	  requires	  
a	  great	  deal	  of	  perception	  for	  the	  adequacy	  of	  the	  measures	  together	  
with	  a	  technical	  understanding	  of	  the	  chemical	  processes	  involved.	  




In	  assessing	  the	  SMS,	  the	  inspector	  should	  keep	  in	  mind	  the	  following	  
essential	  characteristics	  of	  an	  effective	  SMS:	  
1. Evidence	  of	  robust	  implementation,	  that	  is,	  the	  establishment	  
of	  clear	  objectives	  and	  clear	  requirements	  that	  are	  consistently	  
and	  rigorously	  followed.	  
2. Qualification	  of	  personnel	  involved	  in	  executing	  the	  safety	  
management	  system,	  facilitating	  formation	  of	  a	  proper	  process	  
hazard	  assessment	  (team),	  reliable	  execution	  of	  the	  
management	  of	  change	  process,	  etc.	  
3. Performance	  monitoring,	  involving	  the	  objectives,	  reports	  and	  
reviews	  for	  1.	  and	  2.	  The	  identification	  and	  dissemination	  and	  
implementation	  of	  lessons	  learned.	  
4. Leadership	  from	  the	  top	  down	  that	  supports	  implementation	  
and	  anticipates	  and	  resolves	  potential	  conflicts	  with	  other	  
corporate	  objectives	  giving	  equal	  priority	  to	  safety.	  
5. Self-­‐assessment	  and	  auditing	  processes	  conducted	  in	  a	  
thorough	  manner	  with	  adequate	  frequency	  followed	  by	  
appropriate	  and	  timely	  implementation	  of	  resulting	  
recommendations.	  	  
Both	  the	  inspector	  and	  the	  operator	  are	  charged	  with	  auditing	  the	  SMS.	  	  
By	  nature	  an	  audit	  requires	  a	  systematic	  and	  evidence-­‐based	  approach.	  
The	  evaluation	  generally	  starts	  with	  an	  overall	  assessment	  as	  to	  
whether	  the	  SMS	  addresses	  all	  the	  necessary	  elements	  of	  Annex	  III.	  	  
Then	  the	  evaluation	  should	  proceed	  to	  each	  element	  of	  the	  SMS	  and	  
systematically	  seek	  to	  find	  evidence	  to	  determine	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  
the	  SMS	  is	  known,	  understood,	  accepted,	  and	  followed	  in	  the	  
organization.	  	  The	  following	  questions	  may	  go	  some	  way	  to	  addressing	  
these	  aspects:	  
• Does	  the	  SMS	  contain	  the	  elements	  from	  Annex	  III	  of	  the	  
Directive?	  
• Are	  responsibilities	  defined	  and	  assigned?	  
• Are	  procedures	  defined,	  implemented	  and	  adhered	  to?	  




• Does	  the	  operation	  on-­‐site	  indicate	  that	  the	  SMS	  functions?	  
• Is	  safe	  operation	  a	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  and	  long	  term	  goal	  of	  the	  
company?	  
Two	  further	  questions	  of	  particular	  importance	  within	  the	  inspection	  of	  
the	  SMS	  are:	  
• How	  good	  is	  the	  SMS?	  
• How	  good	  does	  the	  operator	  believe	  the	  SMS	  to	  be?	  
	  
ASSESSING	  ORGANIZATION	  AND	  PERSONNEL	  	  
Some	  key	  aspects	  of	  the	  safety	  management	  system	  are	  embedded	  in	  
the	  organizational	  structure,	  including	  the	  assignment	  of	  roles	  and	  
responsibilities	  to	  job	  functions,	  identifying	  competency	  and	  training	  
needs	  of	  the	  persons	  assigned	  to	  the	  specific	  job	  functions,	  and	  
establishing	  the	  communication	  mechanisms	  for	  providing	  important	  
information	  across	  and	  up	  and	  down	  the	  organization.	  	  In	  effect,	  the	  
safety	  management	  system	  provides	  the	  essential	  infrastructure	  to	  
support	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  system.	  	  	  
	  
Important	  considerations	  
When	  the	  SMS	  procedures	  have	  been	  outsourced.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  
verify	  implementation	  of	  the	  SMS	  at	  the	  site.	  	  In	  all	  cases,	  it	  is	  never	  
sufficient	  to	  rely	  on	  written	  procedures,	  but	  even	  more	  so	  when	  writing	  
the	  SMS	  has	  been	  outsourced.	  
Employee	  training.	  The	  organization	  of	  personnel	  training	  is	  an	  
important	  issue	  of	  the	  general	  topic	  of	  “organization	  and	  personnel”.	  	  	  
Both	  operator	  employees	  and	  contractor	  employees	  need	  to	  be	  aware	  
of	  process	  safety	  issues	  and	  companies	  must	  monitor	  whether	  their	  
procedures	  for	  organizing	  and	  training	  their	  employees	  and	  organizing	  
contractors	  are	  functioning.	  	  	  




Contractor	  communication	  and	  training.	  Just	  as	  for	  employees,	  the	  
operator	  should	  proactively	  provide	  contractor	  employees	  complete	  
information	  on	  the	  hazards	  associated	  with	  their	  work	  and	  control	  
measures	  to	  minimise	  the	  risk	  of	  accident.	  	  	  
	  
What	  does	  success	  look	  like?	  
	  
The	  following	  are	  examples	  volunteered	  by	  participants	  from	  their	  
inspection	  experience:	  
	  
•	   Safety	  is	  a	  management	  agenda	  item	  –	  it	  appears	  as	  a	  regular	  and	  
important	  item	  at	  managerial	  meetings,	  not	  just	  safety	  meetings.	  
•	   Major	  hazards	  are	  addressed	  systematically	  in	  identifying	  
competency,	  training,	  procedures	  and	  control	  measures.	  
•	   Safety	  critical	  tasks	  have	  been	  systematically	  identified	  and	  
documented.	  
•	   There	  is	  sufficient	  evidence	  that	  employees	  and	  contractors	  are	  
involved	  in	  the	  development	  and	  delivery	  of	  training	  and	  
procedures.	  
•	   Training	  records	  reflect	  the	  implementation	  of	  training	  to	  address	  
the	  identified	  needs	  and	  testing	  of	  competence	  is	  routinely	  
conducted	  as	  follow-­‐up	  to	  training	  or	  when	  replacing	  staff	  in	  a	  
safety	  critical	  function.	  
•	   Interviews	  with	  employees	  confirm	  that	  procedures	  described	  in	  
written	  documents	  are	  understood	  and	  followed.	  
•	   Selection	  and	  management	  of	  contractors	  and	  temporary	  workers	  
reflects	  competency	  requirements	  identified	  for	  safety	  critical	  tasks	  
(certification,	  qualifications	  and	  experience).	  
•	   Contractor	  supervision	  and	  follow-­‐up	  is	  a	  routine	  part	  of	  company	  
procedure	  and	  appropriately	  includes	  attention	  to	  risk	  








ASSESSING	  THE	  IDENTIFICATION	  AND	  EVALUATION	  OF	  
MAJOR	  HAZARDS	  AND	  RISKS	  
Risk	  assessment	  is	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  the	  SMS.	  	  It	  is	  a	  continuous	  
process	  in	  the	  global	  life-­‐cycle	  of	  a	  company.	  	  	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  
identification	  and	  evaluation	  of	  major	  hazards	  and	  risks	  is	  to	  ensure	  
proper	  control	  of	  low-­‐probability,	  high	  consequence	  events.	  
	  
Important	  considerations	  
The	  role	  of	  management.	  	  Since	  management	  is	  responsible	  for	  
managing	  resources,	  by	  necessity	  it	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  ensuring	  adequate	  
resources	  are	  allocated	  to	  maintain	  the	  proper	  control	  measures	  to	  
address	  the	  risks.	  	  	  
The	  relevance	  of	  accident	  lessons	  learned	  to	  the	  risk	  assessment.	  	  It	  is	  
useful	  for	  the	  inspector	  to	  ask	  the	  company	  whether	  it	  has	  researched	  
past	  accidents	  in	  conducting	  the	  risk	  assessment.	  	  Relevant	  findings	  
from	  past	  accidents	  should	  be	  used	  as	  input	  since	  the	  lessons	  learned	  
often	  influence	  and	  provide	  new	  information	  to	  improve	  standards	  and	  
codes	  of	  practice.	  	  	  
What	  does	  success	  look	  like?	  
The	  following	  are	  examples	  volunteered	  by	  participants	  from	  their	  
inspection	  experience:	  
• Risk	  assessment	  drives	  control	  processes	  for	  managing	  all	  of	  
the	  following:	  
o Operating	  procedures	  
o Equipment	  
o Training	  
o Inspections	  and	  maintenance	  
o Emergency	  planning	  




• Identification	  and	  evaluation	  of	  major	  hazards	  and	  risks	  are	  
clearly	  proportionate	  in	  the	  site’s	  risk	  management	  approach.	  
• Employees	  and	  contractors	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  risks	  associated	  
with	  their	  work	  and	  their	  role	  in	  controlling	  them.	  
• The	  site	  risk	  assessment	  and	  individual	  process	  risk	  
assessments	  are	  fully	  documented,	  including	  the	  process	  
followed,	  results	  and	  information	  used	  to	  produce	  the	  
outcome.	  	  Control	  measures	  and	  associated	  actions	  
recommended	  by	  the	  risk	  assessment	  should	  be	  documented	  
including	  follow-­‐up	  (when	  and	  how	  they	  were	  implemented).	  
• There	  is	  a	  systematic	  selection	  and	  application	  of	  risk	  
assessment	  methods	  and	  the	  consequence	  analysis	  was	  
conducted	  by	  a	  competent	  expert.	  
• The	  off-­‐site	  risk	  is	  communicated	  transparently	  to	  senior	  
management	  and	  all	  stakeholders.	  
	  
ASSESSING	  THE	  MANAGEMENT	  OF	  CHANGE	  (MOC)	  
PROCESS	  
Seveso	  site	  operators	  often	  are	  not	  sufficiently	  aware	  that	  failure	  in	  the	  
management	  of	  change	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  common	  causes	  of	  accidents.	  	  
Every	  accident	  that	  occurs	  is	  proof	  that	  the	  safety	  management	  system	  
is	  not	  100%	  working	  to	  control	  the	  risks	  as	  it	  should.	  	  Sometimes	  the	  
accident	  may	  be	  caused	  by	  latent	  errors,	  that	  is,	  from	  a	  change	  that	  was	  
implemented	  many	  years	  ago	  but	  never	  communicated	  or	  documented	  
or	  assessed	  in	  any	  way,	  and	  the	  associated	  risk	  only	  became	  evident	  
when	  the	  accident	  occurred.	  	  	  
	  
Important	  considerations	  
Management	  of	  change	  and	  aging	  of	  installations.	  	  Once	  a	  piece	  
of	  equipment	  changes	  the	  operating	  process,	  this	  is	  an	  operational	  
change.	  	  Replacement	  of	  parts	  is	  often	  simply	  not	  exchange	  of	  one	  




piece	  of	  one	  piece	  of	  equipment	  for	  another.	  	  It	  may	  be	  an	  upgrade	  that	  
imposes	  changes	  on	  interfacing	  parts	  of	  the	  process	  or	  it	  may	  even	  
require	  a	  process	  re-­‐design.	  	  	  The	  material	  composition	  may	  have	  
changed	  and	  may	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  downstream	  processes.	  	  	  
Organizational	  change.	  	  The	  process	  of	  managing	  organization	  of	  
change	  should	  include	  identification	  of	  safety	  critical	  roles	  and	  the	  
workload,	  competences	  and	  specialised	  training	  associated	  with	  each	  
role.	  	  	  The	  risk	  analysis	  should	  serve	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  determining	  
whether	  additional	  competency,	  training	  or	  a	  different	  workload	  
distribution	  is	  required.	  	  
Involving	  human	  resources.	  	  The	  human	  resources	  department	  may	  
be	  important	  in	  assessing	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  change,	  projecting	  it	  
out	  over	  the	  short	  and	  medium-­‐term	  and	  communicating	  it	  to	  
management	  and	  other	  staff	  as	  might	  be	  appropriate.	  	  	  	  
	  
What	  does	  success	  look	  like?	  
• Within	  the	  policy	  of	  the	  company	  a	  safety	  relevant	  change	  is	  
clearly	  defined.	  
• The	  MoC	  process	  has	  a	  systematic	  hazard	  identification	  and	  
evaluation	  process.	  
• MoC	  procedures	  are	  known	  by	  all	  personnel	  and	  applied	  
systematically.	  
• Initiated	  changes	  are	  tracked	  all	  the	  way	  through	  to	  close-­‐out	  
and	  all	  changes	  are	  documented	  in	  procedures,	  piping	  and	  
instrumentation	  diagrammes	  (P&ID),	  etc.	  
• Temporary	  changes	  are	  closed	  out	  and	  do	  not	  become	  
permanent	  by	  default.	  
• Responsibilities	  are	  defined	  for	  initiating	  and	  authorising	  
changes	  as	  well	  as	  approval	  on	  completion.	  
• The	  MoC	  process	  is	  led	  by	  management.	  
	  




ASSESSING	  MONITORING	  OF	  PERFORMANCE,	  AUDIT	  AND	  
REVIEW	  
Whether	  the	  company	  has	  an	  audit	  team	  for	  process	  safety	  (at	  
company	  or	  corporate	  level)	  is	  one	  of	  the	  key	  questions	  for	  the	  
assessment	  of	  the	  SMS	  suitability	  for	  monitoring,	  auditing	  and	  
reviewing	  performance.	  The	  team	  should	  have	  responsibility	  for	  
planning	  and	  conducting	  audits,	  setting	  audit	  intervals,	  determining	  the	  
content	  of	  the	  audit	  and	  ensuring	  that	  actions	  are	  tracked.	  	  Of	  
importance	  is	  that	  the	  audit	  team	  is	  independent	  of	  the	  operations	  
section	  which	  is	  being	  audited.	  	  Sometimes	  a	  company	  will	  not	  have	  a	  
formal	  audit	  or	  monitoring	  system	  but	  other	  audits	  and	  routine	  offer	  
feedback	  on	  safety	  performance.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Important	  considerations	  
Responsibility	  for	  the	  SMS.	  	  Responsibility	  for	  the	  SMS	  should	  be	  
distributed	  over	  a	  number	  of	  positions	  within	  the	  organisation	  and	  
involve	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  line	  management.	  There	  should	  be	  a	  process	  
embedded	  in	  the	  SMS	  to	  check	  periodically	  that	  assigned	  personnel	  
understand	  and	  are	  performing	  the	  tasks	  allocated	  in	  a	  competent	  and	  
timely	  manner.	  It	  may	  be	  that	  a	  small	  site	  might	  have	  one	  person	  
responsible	  for	  the	  SMS,	  but	  for	  most	  sites	  it	  is	  not	  recommended.	  	  	  
Safety	  performance	  indicator.	  	  There	  is	  a	  need	  for	  objective	  and	  
consistent	  measures	  which	  address	  safety	  critical	  activities.	  One	  
possible	  approach	  is	  the	  use	  of	  (Process)	  Safety	  Performance	  Indicators	  
SPIs.	  	  If	  the	  SMS	  is	  effective	  then	  the	  operator	  should	  be	  able	  to	  
demonstrate	  that	  the	  values	  within	  the	  SPIs	  are	  improving	  or	  at	  least	  
constant,	  that	  the	  improvements	  are	  maintained	  over	  time	  and	  that	  
spot-­‐checks	  by	  authority	  inspectors	  validate	  the	  situation	  as	  described	  
by	  the	  indicators.	  	  
Many	  inspectors	  have	  noted	  that	  the	  inspection	  should	  include	  a	  review	  
of	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  safety	  performance	  indicators,	  if	  the	  company	  
formally	  maintains	  such	  a	  feedback	  system.	  	  	  They	  offered	  a	  number	  of	  




suggestions	  to	  other	  inspectors	  on	  evaluating	  such	  systems	  as	  part	  of	  
SMS	  inspection:	  
• The	  company	  must	  use	  indicators	  based	  on	  its	  own	  operations	  
and	  experience	  with	  them.	  	  Inspectors	  should	  also	  question	  
why	  the	  companies	  have	  chosen	  particular	  topics	  for	  indicators	  
and	  how	  the	  management	  has	  determined	  that	  they	  are	  
important.	  
• Inspection	  of	  the	  SMS	  should	  be	  based	  on	  more	  than	  just	  the	  
output	  from	  the	  indicators.	  	  Qualitative	  feedback,	  e.g.,	  from	  
audits,	  occurrence	  of	  near	  misses	  and	  accidents,	  should	  also	  be	  
regularly	  reported	  with	  lessons	  and	  recommendations	  
extracted	  and	  incorporated	  into	  the	  safety	  management	  
system.	  	  	  	  
• Companies	  should	  report	  on	  competency	  and	  training	  in	  their	  
indicators.	  	  Several	  examples	  of	  measures	  of	  training	  are	  
provided	  in	  various	  guidance	  documents	  that	  have	  been	  
published	  by	  industry	  and	  government	  on	  safety	  performance	  
indicators.	  	  	  
• Are	  the	  right	  questions	  being	  asked?	  When	  collecting	  data	  on	  
near	  misses	  a	  high	  collection	  rate	  should	  make	  the	  operator	  
proud,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  early	  stage	  of	  the	  programme.	  There	  is	  a	  
need	  to	  compare	  smaller	  incidents	  (near	  misses)	  to	  the	  
number	  of	  accidents.	  	  
• The	  quality	  of	  the	  analysis	  of	  feedback	  is	  important.	  	  To	  
evaluate	  analytical	  quality,	  inspectors	  can	  inquire	  about	  the	  
analytical	  process,	  e.g.,	  who	  performs	  the	  analysis,	  the	  
methods	  used,	  and	  how	  feedback	  is	  selected	  for	  analysis	  (for	  
example,	  if	  a	  dataset	  is	  large	  or	  certain	  data	  are	  generated	  
continuously).	  	  They	  may	  also	  ask	  to	  see	  an	  example	  of	  a	  report	  
summarising	  results	  of	  an	  analysis	  and	  associated	  
recommendations	  for	  follow-­‐up.	  




What	  does	  success	  look	  like?	  
In	  identifying	  success	  the	  inspector	  needs	  to	  look	  for	  	  
• Evidence,	  via	  documentation,	  observation	  and	  interviews,	  that	  
the	  appropriate	  behaviours	  and	  activities	  have	  taken	  place	  
within	  the	  company.	  	  
• Senior	  management	  views	  the	  audit	  as	  an	  important	  activity	  
contributing	  to	  continuous	  improvement	  rather	  than	  just	  a	  
compliance	  activity.	  
• Management	  is	  involved	  in	  meetings	  to	  prepare	  for	  audits	  and	  
discuss	  results	  and	  follow-­‐up.	  
• The	  audit	  process	  completes	  the	  entire	  feedback	  loop	  of	  the	  
so-­‐called	  Deming-­‐Cycle,	  i.e.,	  Plan-­‐Do-­‐Check	  Act	  completed.	  
• All	  elements	  of	  the	  SMS	  are	  reviewed	  and	  results	  of	  the	  audit	  
are	  fed	  back	  into	  the	  SMS	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	  
The	  following	  document	  provides	  a	  more	  detailed	  summary	  of	  the	  
exchange	  of	  knowledge	  and	  experience	  among	  Seveso	  inspectors	  at	  the	  
Mutual	  Joint	  Visit	  on	  Safety	  Management	  Systems.	  















The	  safety	  management	  system	  is	  now	  considered	  a	  central	  component	  
of	  modern	  process	  safety	  management.	  	  It	  was	  first	  adopted	  into	  
various	  European	  national	  laws	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  most	  notably	  in	  the	  
United	  Kingdom	  for	  offshore	  facilities	  following	  the	  1988	  Piper	  Alpha	  
disaster	  in	  the	  North	  Sea.	  	  With	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  Seveso	  II	  Directive	  in	  
1996	  (Directive	  96/82/EC),	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  safety	  management	  
system	  was	  enshrined	  as	  an	  essential	  element	  in	  control	  of	  sites	  with	  
major	  chemical	  hazards	  across	  the	  European	  Union.	  	  The	  Cullen	  Report	  
that	  was	  issued	  following	  the	  Piper	  Alpha	  disaster	  also	  introduced	  the	  
operator	  obligation	  to	  “demonstrate”	  that	  it	  has	  a	  safety	  management	  
system	  and	  recommended	  that	  regulators	  employ	  a	  systematic	  
approach	  to	  inspections	  that	  was	  equally	  focused	  on	  compliance	  with	  
safety	  management	  criteria	  as	  well	  as	  technical	  standards.	  Error!	  
Reference	  source	  not	  found.	  
With	  the	  entering	  into	  force	  of	  the	  Seveso	  II	  Directive)	  the	  Member	  
States	  were	  required	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  operator	  of	  an	  establishment	  
falling	  under	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  Directive	  draws	  up	  a	  policy	  for	  the	  
prevention	  of	  major	  accidents.	  This	  policy	  shall	  be	  designed	  to	  
guarantee	  a	  high	  level	  of	  protection	  for	  man	  and	  the	  environment.	  For	  
lower-­‐tier	  establishments	  this	  requirement	  is	  manifested	  in	  the	  
obligation	  to	  establish	  a	  major	  accident	  prevention	  policy	  (MAPP)	  under	  
Article	  7	  of	  the	  Directive.	  	  This	  document	  should	  take	  account	  of	  the	  
principles	  contained	  in	  Annex	  III.	  For	  upper-­‐tier	  establishments	  the	  
operator	  must	  establish	  both	  a	  major	  accident	  prevention	  policy	  and	  a	  
safety	  management	  system	  (SMS)	  for	  implementing	  it.	  	  According	  to	  
Article	  9	  of	  the	  Directive,	  the	  operator	  must	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  
MAPP	  and	  the	  SMS	  have	  been	  put	  into	  effect	  consistent	  with	  the	  




principles	  articulated	  in	  Annex	  III.	  	  The	  Directive	  also	  clearly	  states	  that	  
the	  level	  of	  complexity	  and	  detail	  of	  the	  safety	  management	  system	  
should	  be	  in	  proportion	  to	  the	  level	  of	  risk	  present	  on	  the	  site.	  
The	  SMS	  as	  described	  in	  Annex	  III	  consists	  of	  the	  organizational	  
structure,	  responsibilities,	  practices,	  procedures,	  processes	  and	  
resources	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  MAPP.	  	  According	  to	  the	  
Annex,	  the	  SMS	  must	  address	  the	  following	  issues:	  	  
• Organization	  and	  personnel	  
• Identification	  and	  evaluation	  of	  major	  hazards	  	  
• Operational	  control	  
• Management	  of	  change	  
• Planning	  for	  emergencies	  	  
• Monitoring	  performance	  
• Audit	  and	  review	  
The	  Annex	  III	  principles	  are	  also	  well-­‐aligned	  with	  the	  structures	  of	  ISO	  
9001	  and	  ISO	  14000	  standards	  for	  quality	  management	  and	  
environmental	  management.	  
Article	  18	  of	  the	  Directive	  requires	  that	  the	  competent	  authority	  
conducts	  a	  systematic	  examination	  of	  the	  systems	  being	  employed	  at	  
an	  establishment,	  whether	  of	  a	  technical,	  organizational	  or	  managerial	  
nature,	  so	  as	  to	  ensure	  in	  particular:	  
• That	  the	  operator	  can	  demonstrate	  that	  he	  has	  taken	  
appropriate	  measures,	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  various	  activities	  
involved	  in	  the	  establishment,	  to	  prevent	  major-­‐accidents,	  	  
• That	  the	  operator	  can	  demonstrate	  that	  he	  has	  provided	  
appropriate	  means	  for	  limiting	  the	  consequences	  of	  major-­‐
accidents,	  on-­‐site	  and	  off-­‐site,	  	  
	  




• That	  the	  data	  and	  information	  contained	  in	  the	  safety	  report,	  
or	  any	  other	  report	  submitted,	  adequately	  reflects	  the	  
conditions	  in	  the	  establishment	  	  
• That	  information	  has	  been	  supplied	  to	  the	  public	  pursuant	  to	  
Article	  13.	  
	  
1.2 CHALLENGES	  IN	  INSPECTING	  SAFETY	  MANAGEMENT	  
SYSTEMS	  
	  
In	  1998	  the	  European	  Commission	  published	  a	  guidance	  document	  
explaining	  how	  the	  fundamental	  elements	  outlined	  in	  Annex	  III	  should	  
be	  broadly	  interpreted	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  control	  of	  major	  chemical	  
hazard	  sites.	  [2]	  	  	  Many	  Member	  States	  also	  produced	  more	  detailed	  
guidance	  for	  operators	  and	  some	  Member	  States	  also	  produced	  tools	  
(e.g.,	  questions	  and	  strategies)	  for	  their	  inspectors	  on	  auditing	  a	  site’s	  
SMS.	  	  
The	  majority	  of	  those	  tasked	  with	  the	  role	  of	  an	  inspector	  within	  the	  
competent	  authorities	  have	  a	  qualification	  in	  a	  technical,	  engineering	  or	  
natural	  science	  discipline.	  The	  assessment	  of	  the	  establishment’s	  
compliance	  with	  technical	  requirements	  and	  its	  process	  for	  determining	  
necessary	  corrective	  measures	  is	  well	  within	  the	  competency	  of	  such	  
qualified	  staff.	  However,	  addressing	  issues	  which	  are	  difficult	  to	  
formulate	  within	  well-­‐defined	  parameters	  is	  a	  very	  different	  type	  of	  
assessment.	  Over	  the	  past	  few	  years,	  methods,	  tools	  and	  approaches	  
have	  been	  developed	  by	  inspectors	  and	  their	  organizations	  to	  cope	  with	  
some	  of	  these	  problems.	  	  However,	  there	  are	  still	  widespread	  questions	  
among	  many	  inspectors	  as	  to	  when	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  SMS	  can	  
determine	  that	  adequate	  steps	  have	  been	  taken,	  in	  particular:	  
• At	  what	  point,	  can	  the	  demonstration	  by	  the	  operator	  be	  
considered	  sufficient?	  
• How	  can	  inspectors	  document	  their	  evidence	  of	  deficiencies	  in	  
the	  SMS	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  be	  able	  to	  derive	  effective	  
enforcement	  measures	  from	  this?	  	  	  




The	  difficulty	  of	  inspecting	  safety	  management	  systems	  in	  chemical	  
process	  establishments	  is	  not	  a	  new	  topic.	  	  Notably,	  a	  number	  of	  
challenges	  were	  already	  foreseen	  in	  an	  initiative	  to	  test	  the	  validity	  of	  
the	  EU	  guidance	  on	  implementation	  of	  MAPP	  and	  SMS	  requirements	  in	  
1997.	  	  Results	  from	  exercises	  conducted	  by	  France	  on	  various	  industrial	  
sites	  concluded	  that	  ”very	  company-­‐specific	  SMS	  can	  be	  very	  difficult	  to	  
assess.”	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  findings	  also	  highlighted	  that	  the	  safety	  culture	  
of	  the	  operator	  can	  make	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  difference	  to	  the	  inspector’s	  
task,	  making	  it	  more,	  or	  less,	  easy.	  	  [1]	  
The	  problem	  of	  evaluating	  the	  SMS	  is	  often	  rooted	  in	  the	  construction	  
of	  the	  safety	  report.	  	  Operators	  vary	  considerably	  in	  their	  skill	  at	  arguing	  
on	  behalf	  of	  the	  robustness	  of	  their	  safety	  management	  systems.	  	  The	  
safety	  report	  does	  not	  always	  create	  a	  narrative	  that	  is	  sufficiently	  
transparent	  in	  connecting	  major	  accident	  risks	  to	  the	  safety	  
management	  system	  and	  relevant	  control	  measures.	  	  The	  inspector	  may	  
struggle	  to	  find	  both	  an	  adequate	  narrative	  on	  paper	  and	  also	  in	  the	  
inspection	  itself	  if	  the	  site	  itself	  cannot	  put	  all	  the	  pieces	  together	  (even	  
if	  they	  might	  exist).	  [3]	  
Inspector	  audits	  of	  SMS	  on	  large	  scale	  vs.	  smaller	  scale	  industrial	  sites	  
also	  may	  face	  different	  challenges.	  	  	  Large	  scale	  enterprises	  and	  
corporations	  belonging	  to	  the	  upper-­‐tier	  establishments	  of	  the	  Seveso	  II	  
Directive	  are	  often	  already	  in	  a	  situation	  that	  a	  management	  system	  is	  
in	  place.	  	  Sometimes	  this	  is	  an	  operative	  necessity.	  	  Sometimes	  it	  is	  the	  
result	  of	  the	  certification	  under	  quality,	  occupational	  health	  and	  safety,	  
or	  environmental	  management	  standards.	  	  In	  this	  type	  of	  facility	  it	  is	  
often	  difficult	  to	  assess	  how	  safety	  specifically	  with	  regard	  to	  major	  
accident	  prevention	  is	  addressed	  (i.e.,	  process	  safety).	  	  This	  situation	  is	  
particularly	  the	  case	  if	  an	  integrated	  management	  system	  has	  been	  
developed	  which	  covers	  the	  whole	  range	  of	  management	  activities.	  	  
This	  complexity	  can	  make	  it	  difficult	  for	  inspectors	  to	  identify	  whether	  
the	  necessary	  systems	  and	  structures	  for	  major	  accident	  prevention	  are	  
in	  place.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  large	  scale	  enterprises	  and	  corporations	  belonging	  
to	  the	  lower-­‐tier	  establishments	  may	  already	  have	  a	  management	  
system	  in	  place.	  	  Nonetheless,	  the	  system	  may	  not	  explicitly	  cover	  the	  




issues	  of	  chemical	  process	  safety	  as	  described	  in	  Annex	  III	  of	  the	  Seveso	  
II	  Directive.	  In	  addition,	  small	  and	  medium-­‐size	  enterprises	  often	  have	  
limited	  resources	  and	  expertise	  for	  understanding	  what	  SMS	  processes	  
they	  need	  so	  to	  establish	  and	  maintain	  an	  SMS	  appropriate	  to	  their	  
risks.	  	  As	  noted	  in	  a	  study	  of	  Article	  7	  implementation	  in	  lower-­‐tier	  sites,	  
“…	  In	  these	  cases	  the	  owner/manager	  is	  alone	  responsible	  for	  
everything	  and	  these	  enterprises	  are	  above	  all	  else	  ruled	  by	  economic	  
constraints.	  	  As	  an	  inevitable	  consequence,	  the	  operators	  have	  only	  a	  
little	  knowledge	  of	  the	  regulations	  relating	  to	  major	  accidents	  which	  
make	  communication	  between	  authorities	  and	  operators	  even	  more	  
difficult.”	  [4]	  	  This	  imbalance	  between	  resources	  and	  requirements	  
creates	  a	  particular	  dilemma	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  the	  inspector	  obtains	  the	  
necessary	  evidence	  to	  assess	  the	  SMS	  on	  such	  sites.	  	  There	  may	  also	  be	  
a	  question	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  inspector,	  whether	  he/she	  can	  be	  
advising	  and	  educating	  the	  operator	  using	  the	  audit	  process.	  	  Moreover,	  
in	  some	  industries,	  it	  may	  not	  be	  unusual	  to	  find	  small	  and	  medium	  
enterprises	  counted	  among	  upper-­‐tier	  sites,	  e.g.,	  storage	  and	  
production	  of	  fireworks,	  explosives,	  agricultural	  chemicals	  and	  fuel,	  
which	  only	  exacerbates	  the	  concerns	  and	  predicament	  of	  the	  inspector.	  
It	  is	  clear	  that	  there	  is	  no	  simple	  formula	  for	  responding	  to	  these	  
challenges	  that	  applies	  individually	  to	  each	  site.	  	  However,	  the	  
systematic	  nature	  of	  an	  audit	  implies	  a	  common	  logic	  that	  should	  be	  
applied	  systematically	  across	  sites.	  	  	  For	  example,	  the	  Belgian	  guidance	  
for	  inspectors	  on	  auditing	  SMS	  proposes	  evaluating	  the	  demonstration	  
evaluation	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  one	  or	  more	  defined	  
measures	  that	  the	  company	  may	  be	  taking.	  	  (The	  company	  may	  also	  
offer	  other	  measures	  or	  justification	  for	  not	  establishing	  some	  measures	  
based	  on	  the	  logic	  embedded	  in	  the	  guidance.)	  	  However,	  even	  when	  
the	  authorities	  have	  established	  a	  systematic	  approach	  to	  auditing,	  the	  
inspector	  may	  still	  find	  it	  difficult	  it	  to	  recognize	  where	  important	  gaps	  
are	  present	  and	  how	  to	  be	  relatively	  confident	  that	  implementation	  in	  
practice	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  written	  company	  procedure.	  	  
For	  this	  reason,	  it	  was	  recognized	  that	  sharing	  knowledge	  and	  
experience	  among	  inspectors	  could	  be	  very	  useful	  for	  benchmarking	  
good	  practice	  on	  inspection	  and	  control	  of	  SMS	  demonstrations.	  	  In	  




CASE	  STUDY:	  	  NOX	  ACCIDENT	  	  During	  the	  start-­‐up	  of	  a	  nitric	  acid	  production	  facility	  a	  huge	  (>	  22	  tonnes)	  of	  nitrous	  oxide	  (NOx)	  was	  released	  at	  a	  height	  of	  80	  metres	  via	  the	  chimney.	  The	  nitric	  acid	  process	  involves	  the	  combustion	  of	  ammonia	  in	  oxygen	  to	  form	  NO,	  followed	  by	  the	  further	  oxidation	  of	  the	  NO	  to	  NO2	  under	  heating.	  The	  NO2	  is	  then	  absorbed	  in	  water	  to	  produced	  nitric	  acid	  ad	  NO.	  	  	  The	  NOx	  emission	  occurred	  in	  the	  early	  morning	  of	  9	  April	  2010	  because	  the	  DeNOx	  plant	  had	  become	  unstable	  during	  start-­‐up.	  The	  emission	  at	  the	  height	  of	  80	  metres	  was	  considered	  a	  “safe	  location”	  for	  the	  establishment	  and	  no	  onsite	  workers	  were	  affected.	  There	  was,	  however,	  a	  cross-­‐border	  emission	  to	  a	  neighbouring	  country	  which	  led	  to	  irritation	  by	  inhalation	  in	  exposed	  members	  of	  the	  public.	  The	  UNECE	  Helsinki	  Treaty	  on	  the	  transboundary	  effects	  of	  industrial	  accidents	  was	  applicable.	  The	  findings	  of	  the	  authorities’	  investigation	  into	  the	  accident	  were:	  There	  was	  insufficient	  water	  supplied	  to	  the	  DeNOx	  installation	  which	  had	  not	  been	  detected.	  
• A	  manual	  valve	  was	  open	  to	  the	  wastewater	  system.	  
• The	  flow	  meter	  before	  the	  manual	  valve	  indicated	  sufficient	  flow.	  
• The	  NOx	  monitoring	  was	  not	  appropriate	  for	  the	  start-­‐up	  process.	  The	  enforcement	  measures	  adopted	  in	  conclusion	  were:	  
• The	  NOx	  monitoring	  should	  be	  carried	  out	  using	  two	  different	  ranges,	  one	  for	  start-­‐up	  and	  one	  for	  normal	  operations.	  
• The	  flow	  meter	  and	  manual	  value	  in	  the	  water	  line	  should	  be	  redesigned	  so	  that	  information	  regarding	  the	  flow	  of	  water	  to	  the	  tower	  of	  the	  DeNOx	  system	  is	  obtained.	  
 




	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  
• The	  manual	  valve	  should	  be	  locked	  in	  position.	  
• The	  operating	  procedures	  should	  be	  modified	  based	  on	  the	  learnings	  from	  the	  incident.	  In	  considering	  the	  role	  of	  the	  SMS	  in	  this	  accident	  deficiencies	  could	  be	  identified	  in	  many	  of	  the	  elements.	  	  
• SMS-­‐2:	  Identification	  of	  Major	  Hazards	  +	  Assessment	  of	  Risks	  
o Low	  flow	  on	  Absorption	  Column	  identified:	  risk	  rating	  too	  low	  
o HAZOP:	  no	  identification	  of	  wrong	  position	  of	  flow	  meter	  vs.	  manual	  valve	  
• SMS-­‐3:	  Operational	  Control	  
o Compilation,	  verification	  and	  validation	  of	  operating	  procedures	  for	  shutdown	  and	  start-­‐up	  of	  the	  installation	  were	  insufficient.	  	  (There	  were	  several	  types	  of	  procedures:	  safety	  critical,	  frequent	  and	  non-­‐frequent).	  
o The	  format	  and	  language	  of	  operating	  procedures	  interfered	  with	  precise	  communication	  of	  procedures	  and	  when	  they	  should	  be	  used.	  
• SMS-­‐4:	  Management	  of	  Change	  
o Change	  of	  operating	  procedures	  did	  not	  follow	  existing	  management	  of	  procedures.	  
o In	  any	  case	  the	  management	  of	  change	  procedures	  themselves	  did	  not	  provide	  sufficient	  criteria	  as	  to	  when	  operating	  procedures	  should	  be	  revised.	  
• SMS-­‐5:	  Emergency	  Preparedness	  
o There	  was	  no	  way	  to	  know	  how	  much	  of	  the	  NOx	  was	  released.	  	  (There	  was	  no	  monitoring.)	  	  
• SMS-­‐6+7:	  Monitoring	  Performance	  and	  Audits	  +	  Review	  
o No	  action	  was	  taken	  following	  	  an	  earlier	  similar	  accident	  
	  




addition,	  this	  exchange	  would	  be	  of	  value	  to	  identify	  common	  priorities	  
for	  further	  development	  of	  knowledge	  and	  tools	  to	  aid	  inspectors	  in	  
these	  efforts.	  
	  
1.3 THE	  MUTUAL	  JOINT	  VISIT	  WORKSHOP	  ON	  SAFETY	  
MANAGEMENT	  SYSTEMS	  
From	  27-­‐29	  October	  2010,	  the	  Regional	  Council	  of	  Darmstadt	  hosted	  a	  
Mutual	  Joint	  Visit	  (MJV)	  workshop	  for	  Seveso	  Inspectors	  in	  Fulda,	  
Germany	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  Safety	  Management	  Systems.	  	  	  	  The	  Regional	  
Council	  of	  Darmstadt	  is	  one	  of	  the	  three	  regional	  competent	  authorities	  
for	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Seveso	  II	  Directive	  in	  the	  German	  State	  of	  
Hessen.	  The	  region	  includes	  the	  cities	  of	  Darmstadt,	  Frankfurt	  am	  Main	  
and	  Wiesbaden	  and	  the	  metropolitan	  Rhine-­‐Main	  region.	  A	  large	  
number	  of	  chemical	  manufacturing	  and	  storage	  facilities	  are	  to	  be	  
found	  in	  a	  region	  which	  is	  also	  home	  to	  circa	  5	  million	  people.	  	  
Workshop	  participants	  consisted	  of	  33	  participants	  from	  inspection	  
authorities	  from	  17	  EU	  Member	  States,	  2	  Candidate	  Countries	  and	  2	  
countries	  of	  the	  European	  Economic	  Area.	  	  In	  addition	  a	  number	  of	  
representatives	  from	  industry	  participated.	  
The	  workshop	  was	  based	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  small	  group	  discussions	  
focused	  on	  various	  topics	  and	  subtopics	  within	  the	  theme	  of	  safety	  
management	  systems.	  	  Each	  work	  group	  was	  asked	  to	  focus	  on	  a	  
different	  type	  of	  operator	  as	  follows:	  	  
• Small	  and	  medium-­‐sized	  enterprises	  (SMEs),	  
• Large	  scale	  enterprises	  and	  corporations	  (upper-­‐tier)	  
• Large	  scale	  enterprises	  and	  corporations	  (lower-­‐tier)	  
The	  MJV	  was	  structured	  into	  a	  series	  of	  seven	  sessions.	  The	  first	  two	  
sessions	  were	  plenary	  sessions	  covering	  general	  introductory	  topics	  as	  
well	  as,	  a	  series	  of	  presentations	  of	  chemical	  accidents	  in	  which	  failures	  
in	  the	  Safety	  Management	  System	  were	  a	  significant	  contribution	  to	  the	  
occurrence	  or	  severity	  of	  the	  accident.	  	  In	  this	  second	  session	  six	  short	  
presentations	  were	  made	  by	  various	  participants	  to	  assist	  in	  focusing	  




discussions	  on	  the	  consequences	  of	  deficiencies	  in	  the	  SMS.	  	  The	  next	  
four	  sessions	  were	  workshop	  sessions	  with	  participants	  divided	  into	  
break-­‐out	  groups	  for	  discussion.	  The	  final	  session	  was	  a	  plenary	  session	  
in	  which	  conclusions	  from	  all	  the	  break-­‐out	  sessions	  were	  discussed	  
together.	  
The	  workshops	  each	  addressed	  a	  different	  SMS	  topic.	  	  For	  reasons	  of	  
time,	  the	  third	  element	  (Operating	  Procedures)	  and	  fifth	  element	  
(Planning	  for	  Emergencies)	  of	  the	  SMS,	  as	  defined	  in	  Annex	  III	  of	  the	  
Seveso	  Directive,	  were	  not	  discussed.	  	  The	  remaining	  SMS	  elements	  
were	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  workshops	  as	  indicated	  below:	  
• Workshop	  I:	  Organization	  and	  Personnel	  
• Workshop	  II:	  Identification	  and	  Evaluation	  of	  Major	  Hazards	  
and	  Risks	  
• Workshop	  III:	  Management	  of	  Change	  
• Workshop	  IV:	  Monitoring	  Performance,	  Audit	  and	  Review	  
	  
Participants	  were	  allocated	  to	  one	  of	  the	  3	  parallel	  break-­‐out	  groups,	  
focused	  on	  a	  different	  type	  of	  operator,	  as	  described	  above,	  but	  the	  
same	  SMS	  inspection	  topic.	  	  Each	  workshop	  concluded	  with	  a	  plenary	  
session	  in	  which	  the	  groups	  came	  together	  to	  share	  their	  results.	  For	  
each	  plenary	  session	  rapporteurs	  noted	  the	  contents,	  
recommendations	  and	  conclusions	  of	  the	  discussions	  and	  in	  the	  final	  
session	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  workshop	  the	  compiled	  results	  were	  
presented	  for	  a	  final	  discussion.	  The	  discussions,	  their	  results	  together	  
with	  the	  introductory	  presentations	  generated	  the	  basis	  for	  this	  
publication.	  	  





2 OVERVIEW	  OF	  SMS	  CONCEPTS	  
AND	  DEFINITIONS	  	  
	  
The	  workshop	  included	  an	  introductory	  session	  to	  establish	  a	  common	  
basis	  for	  discussion	  about	  inspecting	  the	  SMS,	  including	  its	  definition,	  
obligations	  of	  Seveso	  establishments,	  and	  general	  principles	  for	  
evaluating	  effectiveness.	  	  This	  chapter	  summarizes	  the	  main	  points	  
resulting	  from	  the	  session.	  
The	  Seveso	  II	  Directive	  establishes	  a	  clear	  obligation	  for	  operators	  of	  
upper-­‐tier	  establishments	  to	  establish	  a	  major	  accident	  prevention	  
policy	  (MAPP)	  and	  a	  safety	  management	  system	  as	  laid	  out	  in	  Annex	  III.	  	  
Whilst	  it	  has	  been	  widely	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  Seveso	  II	  Directive	  is	  
not	  well	  worded	  in	  regard	  to	  similar	  lower-­‐tier	  site	  obligations,	  lower-­‐
tier	  establishments	  are	  in	  fact	  required	  to	  establish	  the	  MAPP	  and	  
ensure	  that	  it	  is	  properly	  implemented.	  It	  is	  to	  be	  designed	  to	  guarantee	  
a	  high	  level	  of	  protection	  by	  appropriate	  means	  including	  management	  
systems.2	  	  Similarly	  the	  safety	  report,	  defined	  in	  Article	  9	  of	  the	  
Directive,	  has	  amongst	  others,	  the	  purpose	  of	  demonstrating	  that	  a	  
major	  accident	  prevention	  policy	  and	  a	  safety	  management	  system	  for	  
implementing	  it	  have	  been	  put	  into	  effect.	  Thus	  it	  is	  safe	  to	  say	  that	  







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Article	  8	  of	  the	  Seveso	  III	  Directive	  (2012/18/EU),	  effective	  1	  June	  
2015,	  clarifies	  this	  obligation:	  “The	  MAPP	  shall	  be	  implemented	  by	  
appropriate	  means,	  structures	  and	  by	  a	  safety	  management	  system	  …”	  




2.1 GENERAL	  REQUIREMENTS	  	  
A	  Safety	  Management	  System	  (SMS)	  includes	  the	  organization,	  the	  
processes	  and	  procedures	  of	  an	  establishment	  together	  with	  their	  
documentation.	  According	  to	  the	  Annex,	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  safety	  
management	  system	  are	  divided	  into	  seven	  specific	  categories:	  	  	  
• Organization	  and	  personnel	  
• Identification	  and	  evaluation	  of	  major	  hazards	  
• Operational	  control	  
• Management	  of	  change	  
• Planning	  for	  emergencies	  
• Monitoring	  perform	  
• Audit	  and	  review	  
All	  operations	  which	  are	  of	  a	  safety	  relevant	  character	  are	  included	  in	  
the	  SMS.	  Suitable	  and	  sufficient	  control	  and	  correction	  processes	  must	  
be	  defined	  so	  that	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  SMS	  can	  be	  assessed.	  
The	  Directive	  requires	  that	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  SMS	  should	  be	  
assessed	  as	  an	  ongoing	  process	  and	  that	  a	  periodic	  review	  of	  the	  MAPP	  
and	  the	  effectiveness	  and	  suitability	  of	  the	  SMS	  is	  carried	  out	  by	  senior	  
management.	  Public	  authorities	  are	  required	  to	  carry	  out	  inspections	  of	  
the	  establishments	  which	  cover	  not	  only	  aspects	  of	  the	  technical	  but	  
also	  organizational	  and	  managerial	  systems.	  	  
Whilst	  the	  SMS	  is	  constituted	  from	  managerial	  structures	  and	  
organizational	  procedures	  in	  written	  form,	  it	  is	  not	  only	  documentation	  
and	  the	  assigning	  of	  responsibilities.	  The	  SMS	  must	  be	  clearly	  lived	  out	  
in	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  operation	  of	  the	  establishment.	  It	  must	  address	  the	  
technical	  safety	  of	  the	  establishment	  and	  must	  contain	  “control-­‐loops”	  
to	  ensure	  that	  the	  necessary	  measures	  are	  carried	  out.	  The	  SMS	  can	  be	  
compared	  to	  the	  continual	  improvement	  cycle	  of	  the	  ISO	  14001	  and	  
other	  international	  standards.	  The	  hierarchy	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  
documents	  including	  the	  written	  processes	  and	  procedures	  is	  the	  




means	  by	  which	  the	  operators	  written	  safety	  policy	  is	  transported	  to	  
the	  employees,	  that	  is	  all	  
employees	  at	  all	  levels.	  
Both	  operators	  and	  authority	  
inspectors	  need	  to	  be	  aware	  
that	  the	  Safety	  Management	  
System	  (SMS)	  may	  be	  one	  of	  
many	  individual	  management	  
systems	  operating	  within	  a	  
company;	  e.g.	  financial	  
management,	  occupational	  
health	  and	  safety	  management	  
(OHSAS	  18001),	  quality	  
management	  (ISO	  9001,	  TQM),	  
environmental	  management	  
(ISO	  14001,	  EMAS).	  	  	  
Management	  systems	  are	  
implemented	  to	  ensure	  that	  a	  variety	  of	  goals	  are	  achieved.	  Some	  
operators	  have	  set	  up	  an	  integrated	  management	  system	  (IMS).	  
However,	  when	  assessing	  an	  IMS	  it	  is	  important	  to	  identify	  whether	  an	  
appropriate	  balance	  between	  the	  various	  goals	  has	  been	  achieved	  and	  
in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Seveso	  II	  Directive,	  whether	  the	  goals	  of	  a	  SMS	  are	  
adequately	  addressed.	  
A	  SMS	  regulates	  various	  aspects	  of	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  establishment	  
and	  the	  processes	  of	  the	  SMS	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  organizational	  
barriers	  between	  the	  hazard	  and	  the	  undesired	  event	  (major	  accident)	  
as	  in	  Reason’s	  Swiss	  Cheese	  Model.	  	  However,	  no	  barrier	  is	  perfect.	  Only	  
a	  combination	  of	  barriers	  is	  suitable	  for	  the	  reliable	  prevention	  of	  major	  
accidents.	  Understanding	  the	  weaknesses	  and	  maintaining	  the	  




Figure	  1:	  Hierarchy	  of	  an	  SMS	  




2.2 ASSESSMENT	  OF	  SMS	  EFFECTIVENESS	  
A	  large	  proportion	  of	  the	  inspection	  activities	  to-­‐date	  have	  
concentrated	  on	  determining	  whether	  or	  not	  procedures	  have	  been	  
implemented	  and	  whether	  responsibilities	  have	  been	  adequately	  
defined.	  	  A	  number	  of	  check-­‐list	  and	  questionnaires	  exist	  to	  assist	  the	  
inspectors	  in	  this	  task.	  	  When	  inspecting	  the	  SMS	  the	  authority	  
inspectors	  need	  to	  be	  aware	  that	  each	  company	  will	  have	  its	  own	  
individual	  design.	  	  Assessment	  of	  the	  SMS	  within	  the	  inspection	  requires	  
a	  great	  deal	  of	  perception	  for	  the	  adequacy	  of	  the	  measures	  together	  
with	  a	  technical	  understanding	  of	  the	  chemical	  processes	  involved.	  
The	  difference	  between	  approving	  the	  SMS	  and	  verifying	  that	  the	  SMS	  
has	  been	  implemented	  was	  also	  raised	  by	  some	  participants.	  	  In	  general	  
all	  inspectors	  are	  charged	  with	  verifying	  that	  a	  MAPP	  and	  SMS	  are	  
applied	  to	  an	  appropriate	  degree	  (i.e.,	  in	  consideration	  of	  
proportionality	  of	  the	  risk)	  on	  Seveso	  sites	  such	  that	  they	  can	  be	  
considered	  compliant	  with	  the	  Directive.	  	  For	  all	  participants	  but	  one	  
the	  authority’s	  responsibility	  to	  oversee	  SMS	  was	  limited	  to	  compliance	  
verification.	  	  One	  participant	  indicated	  that	  its	  government	  authority	  
also	  was	  required	  to	  formally	  approve	  the	  MAPP.	  
Assessing	  the	  SMS	  should	  keep	  in	  mind	  the	  following	  essential	  
characteristics	  of	  an	  effective	  SMS:	  
• Robust	  implementation,	  that	  is	  the	  establishment	  of	  clear	  
objectives	  and	  clear	  requirements,	  that	  are	  consistently	  and	  
rigorously	  followed.	  
• Qualification	  of	  personnel	  involved	  in	  executing	  the	  safety	  
management	  system,	  facilitating	  formation	  of	  a	  proper	  process	  
hazard	  assessment	  (team),	  reliable	  execution	  of	  the	  
management	  of	  change	  process,	  etc.	  
• Performance	  monitoring,	  involving	  the	  objectives,	  reports	  and	  
reviews	  for	  the	  previous	  two	  points.	  The	  identification	  and	  
dissemination	  and	  implementation	  of	  lessons	  learned.	  




• Leadership	  from	  the	  top	  down	  that	  supports	  implementation	  
and	  anticipates	  and	  resolves	  potential	  conflicts	  with	  other	  
corporate	  objectives	  giving	  equal	  priority	  to	  safety.	  
• Self-­‐assessment/auditing	  processes	  that	  are	  conducted	  in	  a	  
thorough	  manner	  with	  adequate	  frequency	  followed	  by	  
appropriate	  and	  timely	  implementation	  of	  resulting	  
recommendations.	  	  
Both	  the	  inspector	  and	  the	  operator	  are	  charged	  with	  auditing	  the	  
SMS.	  	  By	  nature	  an	  audit	  requires	  a	  systematic	  and	  evidence-­‐based	  
approach.	  The	  evaluation	  generally	  starts	  with	  an	  overall	  
assessment	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  SMS	  addresses	  all	  the	  necessary	  
elements	  of	  Annex	  III.	  	  Then	  the	  evaluation	  should	  proceed	  to	  each	  
element	  of	  the	  SMS	  and	  systematically	  seek	  to	  find	  evidence	  to	  
determine	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  SMS	  is	  known,	  understood,	  
accepted,	  and	  followed	  in	  the	  organization.	  	  The	  following	  
questions	  may	  go	  some	  way	  to	  addressing	  these	  aspects:	  
• Does	  the	  SMS	  contain	  the	  elements	  from	  Annex	  III	  of	  the	  
Directive?	  
• Are	  responsibilities	  defined	  and	  assigned?	  
• Are	  procedures	  defined,	  implemented	  and	  adhered	  to?	  
• Does	  the	  operation	  on-­‐site	  indicate	  that	  the	  SMS	  functions?	  
• Is	  safe	  operation	  a	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  and	  long	  term	  goal	  of	  the	  
company?	  




Figure	  2:	  	  Model	  of	  SMS	  based	  on	  ISO	  14001	  
Two	  further	  questions	  of	  particular	  importance	  within	  the	  inspection	  of	  
the	  SMS	  are:	  
• How	  good	  is	  the	  SMS?	  
• How	  good	  does	  the	  operator	  believe	  the	  SMS	  to	  be?	  
In	  answering	  these	  questions	  it	  is	  necessary	  in	  the	  first	  instance	  for	  the	  
operator	  to	  have	  an	  effective	  measure.	  [1]	  The	  time	  between	  (major)	  
accidents	  is	  not	  suitable	  as	  the	  only	  measure	  of	  process	  safety,	  and	  
neither	  are	  Lost	  Time	  Injury	  Rates	  (LTIR)	  nor	  Fatal	  Accident	  Rates	  (FAR)	  
from	  occupational	  safety	  appropriate.	  There	  is	  a	  need	  for	  objective	  and	  
consistent	  measures	  which	  address	  safety	  critical	  activities.	  One	  
possible	  approach	  is	  the	  use	  of	  (Process)	  Safety	  Performance	  Indicators	  
(P)SPIs.	  If	  the	  SMS	  is	  effective	  then	  the	  operator	  should	  be	  able	  to	  
demonstrate	  that	  the	  values	  within	  the	  SPIs	  are	  improving	  or	  at	  least	  
constant,	  that	  the	  improvements	  are	  maintained	  over	  time	  and	  that	  
spot-­‐checks	  by	  authority	  inspectors	  validate	  the	  situation	  as	  described	  
by	  the	  indicators.	  	  




A	  number	  of	  publications	  exist	  which	  provide	  guidance	  on	  developing	  
safety	  indicators3:	  
• HSE	  (UK)	  Developing	  process	  safety	  indicators:	  A	  step-­‐by-­‐step	  
guide	  for	  chemical	  and	  major	  hazard	  industries	  (2006)	  
http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/books/hsg254.htm	  
• HSE	  (UK)	  Key	  process	  safety	  performance	  indicators:	  	  A	  short	  
guide	  for	  Directors	  and	  CEOs	  (2008)	  
www.hse.gov.uk/leadership/keyindicators.pdf	  	  	  
• RIVM	  (The	  Netherlands):	  	  A	  literature	  review	  on	  safety	  





• RIVM	  (The	  Netherlands):	  Safety	  performance	  indicators	  for	  the	  
safety	  management	  of	  Seveso	  companies	  (2012	  -­‐	  in	  Dutch)	  
http://www.gevaarlijkelading.nl/sites/default/files/default/veil
igheidsindicatoren_brzo.pdf	  




• CCPS	  (USA)	  Process	  Safety	  Leading	  and	  Lagging	  Metrics	  –	  You	  
Don’t	  Improve	  What	  You	  Don’t	  Measure	  (2006)	  
www.aiche.org/sites/.../CCPS_Process	  Safety_Lagging_2011_2-­‐
24.pdf	  	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Several	  publications	  have	  been	  issued	  on	  process	  safety	  performance	  
indicators	  since	  this	  workshop	  took	  place	  and	  they	  have	  also	  been	  
added	  here	  to	  the	  list	  presented	  in	  the	  workshop.	  




• The	  Energy	  Institute.	  Research	  report:	  Human	  factors	  




• OECD	  Guidance	  on	  developing	  safety	  performance	  indicators	  




Assessment	  of	  individual	  SMS	  elements	  
The	  audit	  of	  the	  SMS	  should	  include	  an	  individual	  assessment	  of	  the	  
effectiveness	  of	  each	  of	  the	  seven	  SMS	  elements.	  	  This	  assessment	  
should	  also	  be	  systematic	  and	  evidence-­‐based.	  	  Specific	  questions	  can	  
be	  used	  to	  guide	  an	  audit	  for	  each	  element	  and	  a	  range	  of	  options	  in	  
this	  regard	  are	  presented	  in	  the	  following	  paragraphs.	  
With	  regard	  to	  organization	  and	  personnel,	  three	  aspects:	  roles	  and	  
responsibilities,	  identification	  of	  training	  needs,	  and	  involvement	  of	  
employees.	  	  In	  assessing	  this	  element,	  questions	  that	  should	  be	  asked	  
are:	  
• Are	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  defined,	  and	  communicated	  to	  
the	  relevant	  people	  with	  clear	  accountabilities	  also	  assigned?	  
• Is	  there	  a	  systematic	  approach	  to	  organizing	  training	  and	  to	  
following	  up	  on	  it?	  
• Do	  employees	  who	  are	  “end	  users”	  participate	  in	  the	  design	  of	  
the	  training	  programme,	  the	  development	  of	  standard	  
operating	  procedures,	  the	  execution	  of	  process	  hazard	  
analyses	  (where	  appropriate),	  etc.?	  
• Is	  there	  a	  clear	  ownership	  of	  the	  safety	  management	  system?	  
• Is	  there	  adequate	  top-­‐down	  management	  commitment	  to	  
process	  and	  plant	  safety	  with	  recognizable	  leadership?	  




• Is	  this	  not	  only	  in	  writing,	  but	  also	  lived	  out?	  –	  Walking	  the	  
talk!	  
• Does	  a	  “management	  loop”	  exist	  which	  involves	  agreeing	  
objectives?	  Is	  the	  objective	  setting	  formal	  and	  individualised	  
and	  follow-­‐up	  using	  defined	  review	  milestones?	  
The	  identification	  and	  evaluation	  of	  major	  hazards	  should	  be	  carried	  
out	  systematically	  and	  consider	  both	  normal	  and	  abnormal	  operation	  
and	  include	  an	  assessment	  of	  their	  likelihood	  and	  severity.	  In	  assessing	  
this	  element	  the	  following	  questions	  are	  relevant:	  
• Are	  the	  hazard	  identification	  processes	  adequate	  (see	  
literature	  on	  HAZID,	  HAZOP)?	  
• Are	  appropriate	  criteria	  defined	  for	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  
identified	  hazards	  and	  the	  risk	  reduction	  measures?	  
• Are	  requirements	  defined	  regarding	  the	  qualification	  of	  the	  
individuals	  who	  are	  to	  lead	  and	  carry	  out	  this	  process?	  
The	  primary	  goal	  of	  plant	  process	  safety	  considerations	  should	  be	  to	  
handle	  inevitable	  hazard	  potentials	  professionally,	  so	  that	  the	  likelihood	  
of	  their	  activation	  and	  adverse	  effects	  to	  environment,	  people	  and	  
assets	  is	  as	  low	  as	  practicable.	  Simply	  put:	  keep	  the	  hazard	  potentials	  
contained.	  
Operational	  control	  covers	  the	  procedures	  and	  instructions	  for	  the	  
operation	  (including	  maintenance)	  of	  plant,	  processes,	  equipment	  and	  
temporary	  stoppages.	  For	  the	  assessment	  of	  this	  element	  questions	  
should	  be	  asked	  with	  regard	  to:	  
• How	  is	  knowledge	  of	  the	  safety	  critical	  processes	  and	  
design/plant	  elements	  transferred	  into	  SOPs	  and	  the	  like?	  
• In	  what	  way	  are	  relevant	  elements	  of	  the	  safety	  review	  
(Process	  Hazard	  Analysis)	  part	  of	  SOPs	  or	  similar	  procedures	  
and	  part	  of	  the	  training	  of	  operators,	  craftsmen	  (and	  others)?	  
• How	  are	  operating	  staff	  (“end	  users”)	  involved	  in	  writing	  
and/or	  reviewing	  procedures?	  




Management	  of	  change	  (MoC)	  involves	  procedures	  for	  planning	  
modifications	  to,	  or	  the	  design	  of	  new	  installations,	  processes	  or	  
storage	  facilities.	  Question	  for	  the	  assessment	  of	  this	  element	  should	  
cover:	  
• Are	  criteria	  defined	  as	  to	  what	  a	  change	  is	  and	  what	  makes	  it	  
critical	  (refer	  to	  HAZID)?	  
• Which	  process	  and	  criteria	  are	  defined	  for	  the	  evaluation	  of	  a	  
modification	  as	  being	  safety	  critical	  and	  how	  can	  safe	  
operation	  be	  ensured?	  –	  HAZOP,	  PHA	  or	  similar.	  
• Is	  an	  MoC-­‐process	  for	  permanent	  and	  temporary	  changes	  
established	  and	  are	  temporary	  changes	  tracked?	  
• Are	  those	  individuals	  requesting	  modifications	  and	  those	  
responsible	  for	  processes	  and	  installations	  which	  are	  to	  be	  
modified	  appropriately	  qualified	  in	  HAZID	  and	  the	  MoC-­‐
process?	  
In	  planning	  for	  emergencies,	  procedures	  to	  identify	  foreseeable	  
emergencies	  by	  systematic	  analysis	  and	  to	  prepare,	  test	  and	  review	  
emergency	  plans	  to	  respond	  to	  such	  emergencies	  are	  to	  be	  defined.	  	  
The	  question	  to	  be	  asked	  in	  assessing	  this	  element	  is	  
• Provided	  that	  all	  of	  the	  requirements	  for	  the	  definition	  of	  
procedures	  are	  fulfilled,	  do	  training	  and	  drills	  take	  place?	  
For	  monitoring	  performance	  a	  range	  of	  information	  is	  used	  including	  
performance	  indicators.	  For	  example,	  in	  one	  well-­‐known	  multinational	  
company	  various	  data	  are	  tracked	  in	  addition	  to	  major	  incidents,	  such	  
as	  loss	  of	  primary	  containment	  and	  status	  of	  process	  hazard	  
assessments.	  For	  the	  diverse	  business	  units,	  as	  appropriate,	  information	  
such	  as	  findings	  from	  internal	  inspections,	  and	  failures	  or	  faults	  in	  safety	  
instrumentation,	  etc.,	  are	  also	  considered.	  	  Investigations	  and	  the	  taking	  
of	  corrective	  action	  as	  a	  result	  of	  reports	  on	  major	  accidents,	  near	  
misses,	  failure	  of	  protective	  measures,	  and	  their	  follow-­‐up	  on	  the	  basis	  
of	  lessons	  learnt,	  are	  also	  an	  important	  part	  of	  performance	  
measurement.	  In	  assessing	  the	  function	  of	  this	  element	  of	  the	  SMS	  the	  
following	  questions	  should	  be	  asked:	  




• Is	  a	  set	  of	  relevant	  performance	  indicators	  identified	  with	  a	  
leading	  function	  relative	  to	  major	  incidents?	  
• Is	  a	  systematic	  approach	  to	  find	  the	  root	  cause	  of	  incidents	  
implemented?	  
• Are	  the	  lessons	  learned	  identified	  and	  communicated	  
effectively?	  
In	  audit	  and	  review,	  a	  periodic	  systematic	  assessment	  of	  the	  major	  
accident	  prevention	  policy	  and	  the	  effectiveness	  and	  suitability	  of	  the	  
safety	  management	  system	  should	  be	  established	  and	  executed.	  This	  
exercise	  involves	  a	  documented	  review	  of	  performance	  of	  the	  policy	  
and	  safety	  management	  system	  and	  its	  updating	  by	  senior	  
management.	  To	  assess	  this	  element	  the	  following	  should	  be	  
considered:	  
• Regular	  self-­‐assessments	  and	  localised	  internal	  audits	  on	  
specific	  topics	  prioritised	  due	  to	  history,	  near-­‐misses,	  and	  
other	  feedback	  
• Independent	  internal	  audit	  function	  and/or	  third	  party	  
inspections	  or	  audits	  
• External	  validations,	  e.g.,	  ISO	  certificates	  
• Reports	  to	  top	  management	  who	  also	  require	  periodic	  reports	  












2.3 SAFETY	  LEADERSHIP,	  CULTURE	  AND	  PERFORMANCE	  
INDICATORS	  	  
On	  17-­‐19	  March	  2010	  the	  European	  Commission’s	  Joint	  Research	  Centre	  
held	  a	  workshop	  on	  “Safety	  Leadership,	  Safety	  Culture	  and	  Safety	  
Performance	  Indicators:	  	  Applying	  the	  Lessons	  of	  Safety	  Leadership,	  
Culture	  and	  Performance	  Measurement	  After	  BP	  Texas	  City”.	  	  The	  
workshop	  was	  targeted	  specifically	  to	  identify	  knowledge,	  tools	  and	  
actions	  for	  achieving	  and	  sustaining	  effective	  leadership	  in	  major	  
accident	  prevention	  across	  the	  process	  industries.	  	  In	  particular,	  the	  
workshop	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  two	  mechanisms,	  safety	  
culture	  and	  safety	  performance	  measurement,	  with	  the	  view	  that	  top	  
management	  can	  influence	  and	  utilize	  them	  to	  promote	  continuous	  and	  
targeted	  safety	  improvement.	  	  Some	  common	  principles	  on	  the	  
importance	  of	  and	  linkage	  between	  these	  three	  concepts	  were	  
summarized	  at	  the	  MJV	  workshop.	  
Safety	  leadership	  and	  the	  role	  of	  safety	  culture	  and	  performance	  
indicators	  gained	  considerable	  prominence	  in	  the	  risk	  management	  
community	  based	  on	  investigation	  findings	  from	  the	  Baker	  Panel	  report	  
ensuing	  from	  the	  17	  March	  2005	  accident	  in	  the	  Texas	  City,	  Texas	  (USA)	  
BP	  refinery.	  	  	  The	  concepts	  themselves	  were	  not	  new	  to	  industrial	  risk	  
management	  but	  prior	  discussion	  was	  largely	  confined	  to	  safety	  experts	  
in	  industry	  (led	  by	  the	  top	  performing	  multinationals	  in	  this	  regard),	  
government	  and	  academia.	  	  In	  fact,	  similar	  themes	  were	  stressed	  in	  the	  
findings	  and	  lessons	  learned	  from	  major	  European	  accidents,	  notably	  BP	  
Grangemouth	  (2000)	  and	  Piper	  Alpha	  (1989).	  	  	  	  
The	  Baker	  Report	  established	  safety	  performance	  indicators	  and	  safety	  
culture	  as	  mainstream	  elements	  of	  process	  safety	  management	  as	  both	  
tools	  and	  evidence	  of	  effective	  safety	  leadership.	  	  The	  main	  thrust	  of	  
the	  report’s	  conclusions	  was	  that	  a	  strong	  safety	  culture	  coupled	  with	  a	  
rigorous	  safety	  management	  system	  is	  a	  root	  level	  defence	  against	  




major	  accidents	  at	  hazardous	  installations.	  	  Moreover,	  corporate	  
management	  cannot	  practice	  its	  oversight	  function	  without	  a	  precisely	  
calibrated	  feedback	  on	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  safety	  management	  
system.	  	  The	  investigation	  report	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Chemical	  Safety	  Board	  of	  
the	  same	  accident	  also	  cited	  numerous	  leadership	  failures	  associated	  
with	  safety	  management	  systems	  in	  its	  investigation	  report,	  noting	  in	  
particular	  gross	  oversights	  in	  terms	  of	  supervision	  and	  training	  of	  
operators,	  communication	  of	  critical	  risk	  management	  tasks,	  and	  
evidence	  of	  a	  culture	  that	  ignored	  the	  importance	  of	  standard	  
procedures.	  	  	  
The	  JRC	  workshop	  sought	  to	  explore	  current	  efforts	  in	  the	  European	  
Union	  to	  promote	  stronger	  safety	  performance	  through	  the	  integration	  
of	  leadership,	  indicators	  and	  measurement.	  	  It	  focused	  on	  three	  
important	  linked	  concepts	  within	  this	  message	  and	  promoted	  within	  the	  
Baker	  Report	  as	  follows:	  
• A	  positive	  safety	  culture	  is	  important	  for	  good	  process	  safety	  
performance.	  
• Leadership	  sets	  the	  process	  safety	  tone	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  
organization.	  It	  also	  includes	  owning	  and	  implementing	  effective	  
policies	  and	  arrangements	  to	  manage	  risks,	  allocating	  resources	  
and	  making	  effective	  decisions	  about	  the	  day	  to	  day	  management	  
of	  business	  risks.	  
• Leaders	  need	  appropriate	  information	  on	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  
process	  safety	  management	  system	  in	  order	  to	  make	  effective	  
decisions	  that	  support	  and	  maintain	  effective	  control	  of	  major	  
hazard	  risks	  and,	  where	  appropriate,	  take	  corrective	  action.	  	  
Two	  developments	  in	  particular	  seemed	  to	  demand	  a	  systematic	  review	  
of	  these	  concepts	  by	  competent	  authorities:	  	  1)	  The	  increasing	  use	  of	  
the	  leadership-­‐culture-­‐measurement	  paradigm	  by	  industry	  in	  risk	  




management	  and	  2)	  the	  more	  focused	  academic	  attention	  on	  
development	  of	  effective	  approaches	  based	  on	  this	  paradigm	  as	  a	  
result.	  	  Seveso	  competent	  authority	  obligations	  most	  notably	  affected	  
by	  these	  developments	  are	  inspections,	  safety	  management	  systems,	  
safety	  reports,	  and	  accident	  investigation.	  	  	  
In	  a	  very	  practical	  way,	  how	  to	  recognize	  weaknesses	  and	  strengths	  in	  
the	  leadership-­‐culture-­‐performance	  measure	  chain	  in	  a	  specific	  context	  
was	  thought	  to	  be	  useful	  in	  both	  active	  and	  reactive	  enforcement	  
situations:	  
• Active	  situations	  are	  situations	  in	  which	  the	  authority	  actively	  seeks	  
to	  encourage	  and	  foster	  use	  of	  these	  concepts	  to	  improve	  major	  
hazard	  control	  on	  the	  site.	  
• Reactive	  situations	  are	  defined	  as	  situations	  in	  which	  the	  operator	  
presents	  such	  activities	  as	  evidence	  of	  compliance	  and	  the	  
competent	  authority	  must	  perforce	  evaluate	  their	  adequacy	  in	  a	  
compliance	  context.	  
Moreover,	  over	  the	  long-­‐term,	  knowledge	  and	  experience	  gained	  by	  
working	  with	  these	  concepts	  in	  practice	  may	  deliver	  an	  even	  more	  
important	  advantage	  to	  competent	  authorities.	  	  In	  particular,	  patterns	  
may	  emerge	  that	  sharpen	  their	  ability	  to	  recognize	  good	  performers	  
and	  also	  understand	  what	  makes	  them	  so.	  	  	  Thus,	  it	  is	  thought	  that	  
competent	  authorities	  may	  generally	  be	  concerned	  about	  how	  the	  	  





CASE	  STUDY:	  	  CHANGING	  A	  HOSE	  COUPLING	  LED	  
TO	  AN	  EXPLOSION	  A	  tank	  containing	  Hydrogen	  Peroxide	  (HP)	  was	  wrongly	  filled	  with	  a	  substance	  called	  “XYZ”	  (DTPA	  and	  Sodium	  Hydroxide),	  exploded	  and	  flew	  over	  the	  factory	  roof,	  but	  thankfully	  no	  one	  was	  injured!	  
So	  wrong,	  step	  by	  step	  
• One	  delivery	  of	  HP	  was	  received	  in	  the	  morning,	  the	  next	  delivery	  was	  expected	  in	  the	  afternoon.	  
• When	  the	  truck	  with	  DTPA,	  arrives,	  the	  gate	  keeper	  phones	  the	  operator	  and	  tells	  him	  that	  HP	  has	  arrived.	  
• The	  plant	  operator	  tells	  the	  driver	  that	  “XYZ”	  is	  called	  HP	  in	  this	  plant,	  but	  the	  tanker	  pipe	  coupling	  does	  not	  fit	  the	  site	  tank	  coupling.	  (This	  is	  the	  last	  barrier	  in	  preventing	  filling	  the	  wrong	  tank).	  	  
• The	  plant	  operator	  calls	  the	  maintenance	  group	  which	  switches	  the	  coupling	  from	  the	  DTPA	  tank	  and	  mounts	  it	  on	  the	  HP	  tank.	  
• The	  filling	  starts	  into	  the	  wrong	  tank,	  temperature	  rises,	  an	  alarm	  sounds,	  filling	  is	  stopped,	  and	  cooling	  with	  water	  is	  not	  successful.	  	  The	  operators	  can	  see	  smoke	  and	  pulsations	  and	  so	  they	  run	  from	  the	  place.	  The	  tank	  explodes…	  
All	  barriers	  are	  broken	  …	  Except	  for	  the	  high	  temperature	  alarm,	  that	  eventually	  stopped	  the	  filling.	  
• Barrier	  1:	  Check	  by	  the	  gate	  keeper	  fails.	  The	  operator	  is	  given	  the	  understanding	  that	  HP	  is	  on	  the	  way	  because	  everybody	  expects	  it!	  
	  
*To	  ensure	  anonymity	  of	  the	  site,	  the	  real	  product	  name	  is	  not	  used.	  
	  




	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  
• Barrier2:	  The	  unique	  coupling	  is	  changed	  and	  cannot	  prevent	  the	  filling	  of	  the	  wrong	  substance.	  
• Barrier3:	  Work	  permission	  for	  the	  change	  is	  not	  granted.	  It	  is	  solved	  ”the	  non-­‐bureaucratic	  way”,	  between	  former	  colleagues?	  
Reflections:	  
• You	  never	  know	  what	  can	  happen!	  Or…	  
• The	  barriers	  are	  important	  but	  cannot	  always	  prevent	  an	  accident.	  
• ”It	  is	  very	  likely	  that	  the	  unlikely	  event	  will	  happen”	  	  
• Focus	  on	  accident	  consequences,	  not	  on	  accident	  probability.	  
Take	  away	  the	  barrier,	  break	  down	  the	  wall	  
• Break	  down	  the	  walls	  between	  the	  people	  that	  do	  the	  practical	  work,	  maintenance	  and	  the	  plant	  operators	  on	  one	  side,	  and	  the	  people	  who	  create	  the	  instructions	  and	  the	  routines	  on	  the	  other	  side.	  
• A	  good	  safety	  management	  system	  can	  only	  be	  created	  with	  mutual	  respect	  and	  confidence	  between	  these	  two	  groups.	  
• A	  SMS	  routine	  is	  only	  working	  if	  it	  is	  understood,	  accepted,	  implemented	  and	  regularly	  followed	  up.	  
• SMS	  routines	  must	  be	  improved	  by	  a	  good	  system	  for	  the	  reporting	  of	  deviations,	  near-­‐misses	  and	  accidents.	  
• The	  very	  important	  process	  knowledge	  of	  the	  operator	  can	  never	  be	  replaced	  by	  good	  routines.	  	  




implementation	  of	  industrial	  risk	  management	  policy	  should	  be	  
adapting	  to,	  and	  even	  benefitting,	  from	  these	  trends.	  
The	  workshop	  consisted	  of	  presentations	  from	  over	  20	  speakers	  from	  
government,	  industry	  and	  academia.	  	  In	  general	  the	  government	  
experts	  presented	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  how	  to	  encourage	  industry	  
to	  take	  leadership	  to	  promote	  effective	  safety	  management	  systems,	  
both	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  overall	  policy	  direction	  (top	  down)	  and	  the	  
standpoint	  of	  enforcement	  measures	  (bottom	  up).	  	  Speakers	  included	  
interventions	  from	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  Norway,	  Czech	  Republic,	  
France	  and	  Germany.	  	  Notably,	  a	  number	  of	  tools	  have	  been	  developed	  
by	  government	  authorities	  to	  guide	  industry	  in	  the	  establishment	  of	  
each	  of	  the	  components	  (safety	  leadership,	  safety	  culture	  and	  safety	  
performance	  indicators).	  	  
Industry	  presentations	  were	  both	  conceptual	  and	  practical.	  	  Some	  
industry	  presenters	  discussed	  the	  philosophical	  approach	  underpinning	  
the	  linkage	  between	  safety	  leadership,	  safety	  culture	  and	  safety	  
performance	  indicators.	  	  BP	  Corporation	  provided	  insight	  on	  their	  
ongoing	  efforts	  following	  the	  BP	  Texas	  City	  accident	  to	  drive	  towards	  
more	  effective	  safety	  management	  through	  focused	  leadership,	  guide	  
corporate	  culture	  towards	  safer	  behaviour,	  and	  to	  measure	  
performance	  to	  provide	  timely	  feedback	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  safety	  
management	  systems	  at	  all	  levels.	  
The	  representatives	  from	  the	  research	  community	  offered	  quite	  diverse	  
perspectives	  from	  research	  findings	  as	  both	  a	  reflection	  of	  lessons	  
learned	  from	  past	  failures	  and	  as	  possible	  clues	  to	  targeting	  
improvements.	  	  The	  presentations	  included	  findings	  on	  the	  linkage	  
between	  behaviours	  of	  actors	  at	  the	  different	  corporate	  levels	  and	  
safety	  culture.	  	  Two	  presentations	  highlighted	  elements	  associated	  with	  
establishment	  of	  safety	  performance	  indicators,	  with	  one	  noting	  the	  
importance	  of	  establishing	  manageable	  measurement	  systems	  and	  the	  




other	  looking	  at	  indicators	  that	  could	  be	  established	  as	  also	  risk	  
communication	  tools.	  	  Another	  presentation	  viewed	  organizational	  
behaviour	  and	  specifically	  potentially	  failures	  through	  the	  prism	  of	  10	  
past	  catastrophic	  events.	  
From	  these	  varied	  presentations	  a	  number	  of	  common	  themes	  
emerged:	  
• The	  importance	  of	  safety	  performance	  indicators	  to	  safety	  
management	  systems	  
A	  safety	  management	  system	  consistently	  implemented	  by	  qualified	  
personnel	  ensures	  a	  high	  level	  of	  safety	  performance.	  However,	  process	  
safety	  management	  needs	  monitoring	  and	  regular	  input	  from	  dedicated	  
leading	  and	  lagging	  indicators	  to	  measure	  how	  safety	  management	  
efforts	  are	  performing.	  	  Performance	  indicators	  are	  important	  
communication	  tools	  to	  track	  the	  system	  properly.	  Internal	  regular	  
checks	  provide	  necessary	  input	  for	  continuous	  improvement.	  However,	  
to	  be	  effective	  and	  credible,	  the	  monitoring	  system	  needs	  to	  be	  
developed	  with	  full	  involvement	  of	  line	  staff.	  
It	  is	  clear	  that	  structured	  performance	  indicators	  are	  being	  developed	  
within	  the	  chemical	  industry.	  	  These	  are	  initially	  being	  concentrated	  
towards	  the	  “lagging	  indicators”	  or	  “outcome	  indicators”	  and	  that	  
“leading”	  or	  “activity”	  indicators	  will	  come	  later.	  	  From	  a	  preventative	  
point	  of	  view,	  the	  activities	  which	  are	  carried	  out	  to	  prevent	  process	  
safety	  incidents	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  more	  relevant.	  
Amongst	  the	  major	  chemical	  and	  petroleum	  companies	  the	  question	  of	  
“safety	  leadership”	  has,	  over	  the	  years,	  increased	  in	  acceptance	  and	  is	  
now	  an	  aspect	  which	  is	  widespread.	  	  But	  the	  concept	  of	  safety	  	  




Figure	  3:	  	  High	  level	  framework	  for	  process	  safety	  management	  [5]	  
leadership	  is	  a	  fragile	  one.	  When	  competition	  with	  other	  company	  
interests	  manifests	  itself,	  then	  all	  too	  often	  safety	  loses	  out.	  	  In	  many	  
cases	  recognition	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  safety	  leadership	  has	  only	  come	  
about	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  an	  accident.	  	  
	  
• The	  link	  between	  safety	  management	  systems	  and	  safety	  
leadership	  
Leaders	  have	  a	  major	  impact	  on	  safety	  and	  staff	  perceptions.	  	  It	  is	  their	  
responsibility	  to	  communicate	  that	  process	  safety	  is	  a	  core	  value	  and	  
that	  the	  organization’s	  safety	  management	  systems	  are	  a	  dynamic	  
element	  of	  the	  overall	  operation.	  	  Leaders	  should	  foster	  learning	  
organizations	  that	  seek	  and	  examine	  feedback	  at	  all	  levels.	  	  This	  implies	  
a	  particular	  rigour	  in	  analysing	  and	  addressing	  risks	  identified	  through	  
an	  honest	  and	  consistent	  application	  of	  the	  safety	  management	  system.	  	  	  
It	  also	  requires	  applying	  recommendations	  resulting	  from	  risk	  analyses,	  




the	  management	  of	  change	  process,	  accidents	  and	  near	  misses,	  
analyses	  of	  safety	  performance	  indicators,	  and	  inspections	  and	  audits,	  
with	  a	  follow-­‐up	  process	  that	  checks	  that	  recommendations	  have	  been	  
carried	  out	  as	  directed.	  
Process	  safety	  leadership	  has	  been	  proved	  to	  make	  good	  business	  
sense,	  but	  this	  message	  is	  often	  lost	  by	  artificial	  lines	  that	  are	  drawn	  to	  
separate	  business	  and	  safety	  standards.	  Those	  establishments	  with	  a	  
robust	  safety	  leadership	  make	  an	  effort	  to	  ensure	  that	  employees	  are	  
not	  confronted	  with	  conflicting	  goals	  and	  objectives.	  
• The	  link	  between	  safety	  leadership,	  safety	  management	  
systems	  and	  safety	  culture	  
It	  is	  important	  that	  leaders	  cultivate	  and	  maintain	  a	  working	  culture	  
that	  motivates	  ongoing	  vigilance	  and	  further	  safety	  improvement.	  	  
While	  development	  of	  modern	  technical	  and	  organizational	  means	  
continue	  to	  be	  relevant	  for	  safe	  manufacturing	  processes,	  optimal	  
functionality	  of	  these	  elements	  can	  only	  be	  achieved	  if	  they	  are	  
supported	  by	  a	  high	  level	  safety	  culture.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  reasonable	  
achievement	  in	  the	  area	  of	  safety	  culture	  cannot	  be	  expected	  unless	  a	  
minimum	  level	  of	  performance	  of	  the	  safety	  management	  system	  is	  in	  
place.	  
Safety	  culture	  is	  the	  whole	  of	  activities	  and	  attitudes,	  shared	  by	  
management	  and	  by	  employees,	  that	  influences	  control	  of	  safety	  and	  
health	  risks	  within	  the	  organization.	  Part	  of	  organizational	  culture	  
includes	  shared	  beliefs	  and	  values	  as	  well	  as	  shared	  language	  and	  
symbols	  for	  communicating	  them	  in	  relevant	  situations.	  	  The	  elements	  
of	  a	  common	  culture	  are	  manifested	  daily	  in	  both	  the	  formalized	  and	  
unformalized	  activities,	  habits,	  and	  behaviours	  of	  all	  layers	  of	  an	  
organization.	  	  	  





Figure	  4:	  	  Overview	  of	  Health	  and	  Safety	  Behaviour	  Standard	  [6]	  
A	  “good”	  safety	  culture	  fosters	  safety	  awareness	  such	  that	  risks	  are	  not	  
normalized	  and	  there	  is	  an	  emphasis	  on	  using	  only	  procedures	  that	  are	  
proved	  to	  work	  and	  fit-­‐for-­‐purpose	  with	  the	  associated	  risks	  
understood.	  	  This	  kind	  of	  culture	  requires	  a	  level	  of	  trust	  between	  
management	  and	  staff	  and	  across	  different	  teams	  so	  that	  there	  can	  be	  
open	  communication	  about	  potential	  risk	  associated	  with	  change	  and	  
situation	  abnormalities.	  	  As	  such,	  there	  should	  be	  a	  clear	  understanding	  
in	  the	  organization	  that	  culture	  is	  not	  an	  individual	  property	  but	  
something	  that	  develops	  in	  the	  interaction	  between	  people	  and	  certain	  
framework	  conditions.	  	  
A	  strong	  learning	  culture	  is	  always	  present	  when	  the	  safety	  culture	  is	  
positive.	  	  A	  learning	  culture	  encourages	  reporting	  of	  events	  and	  near-­‐
misses	  relevant	  to	  process	  safety.	  All	  events	  are	  investigated	  to	  the	  




extent	  warranted	  by	  their	  significance	  and	  potential	  for	  learning.	  
Reporting	  abnormalities	  and	  unintended	  events	  is	  encouraged	  and	  the	  
system	  for	  reporting	  and	  analysing	  an	  occurrence	  is	  viewed	  as	  objective	  
and	  simple	  to	  use.	  	  
	  
• The	  role	  of	  authorities	  in	  influencing	  safety	  leadership	  and	  
culture	  
Safety	  leadership	  and	  safety	  indicators	  do	  not	  make	  safety	  but	  they	  are	  
strongly	  influenced	  by	  the	  commitment	  of	  both	  and	  industry	  and	  
government	  regulators	  to	  high	  safety	  performance.	  	  It	  is	  important	  that	  
government	  holds	  industry	  accountable	  for	  safety	  in	  in	  its	  business	  
decisions.	  	  	  Progress	  in	  safety	  performance	  can	  only	  be	  achieved	  when	  
both	  policymakers	  and	  management	  dare	  to	  take	  a	  risk	  based	  on	  
knowledge	  and	  acceptance	  of	  no	  compliance.	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  
regulators	  should	  establish	  clear	  expectations	  at	  the	  top	  level	  endorsing	  
enforcement	  approaches	  that	  engage	  and	  challenge	  an	  organization’s	  
senior	  leadership.	  	  	  
The	  regulator’s	  influence	  is	  largely	  rooted	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  establish	  and	  
monitor	  standards	  of	  safety	  performance.	  	  Safety	  leadership	  and	  safety	  
culture	  are	  linked	  responsibilities	  whose	  inspection	  and	  enforcement	  
belongs	  solely	  to	  the	  operator.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  regulatory	  
inspectors	  cannot	  enforce	  a	  particular	  culture	  or	  leadership	  style;	  
however,	  they	  can	  observe	  the	  consequences	  in	  safety	  performance.	  	  
The	  performance	  of	  the	  safety	  management	  system	  in	  particular	  holds	  
clues	  to	  the	  overall	  leadership	  and	  cultural	  attitudes	  of	  the	  organization.	  	  
Hence,	  it	  is	  particularly	  important	  that	  inspectors	  give	  attention	  to	  
evidence	  of	  the	  functional	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  various	  elements	  of	  the	  
safety	  management	  system.	  	  In	  turn	  policymakers	  should	  make	  
observations	  from	  which	  company	  management	  can	  obtain	  insights	  on	  
needed	  improvements	  in	  safety	  leadership	  and	  safety	  culture.	  	  	  









3 ASSESSMENT	  OF	  SMS	  BY	  THE	  AUTHORITY	  
INSPECTORS	  
A	  session	  on	  SMS	  by	  authorities	  was	  carried	  out	  for	  each	  of	  the	  following	  
four	  elements	  in	  a	  workshop	  format	  with	  the	  participants	  divided	  into	  
three	  groups:	  
• Organization	  and	  personnel	  
• Identification	  and	  evaluation	  of	  major	  hazards	  and	  risks	  
• Management	  of	  change	  
• Monitoring	  performance,	  audit	  and	  review	  
Experience	  suggests	  that	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  accidents	  have	  their	  
roots	  in	  at	  least	  one	  of	  these	  components	  of	  the	  SMS.	  	  
The	  break-­‐out	  sessions	  were	  also	  divided	  into	  three	  different	  groups	  that	  
looked	  at	  each	  topic	  with	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  site,	  as	  
follows:	  
	  
• Lower-­‐tier	  establishments	  	  
• Upper-­‐tier	  establishments	  which	  are	  small	  or	  medium-­‐size	  
enterprises	  (SMEs)	  
• Upper-­‐tier	  establishments	  which	  are	  large	  enterprises	  or	  part	  of	  
corporations.	  
Each	  break-­‐out	  session	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  plenary	  discussion	  in	  which	  
each	  group’s	  key	  points	  and	  observations	  were	  discussed.	  	  Furthermore,	  
in	  the	  concluding	  session,	  the	  four	  workshop	  topics	  were	  reviewed	  again	  
under	  the	  headings:	  “Issues”,	  “Challenges”,	  and	  “What	  does	  success	  
look	  like?”	  to	  provide	  a	  focus	  which	  allows	  an	  inspector	  to	  develop	  a	  
strategy	  to	  address	  the	  topic	  within	  their	  own	  inspection	  activities.	  	  This	  
chapter	  synthesizes	  the	  results	  of	  the	  discussions	  for	  each	  topic.	  




The	  authority’s	  strategy	  for	  assessing	  the	  SMS	  should	  assume	  that	  the	  
structure	  of	  the	  SMS	  will	  vary	  depending	  on	  the	  type	  of	  hazard	  inherent	  
in	  the	  facility	  along	  with	  other	  facility	  characteristics	  but	  most	  notably,	  
the	  size	  and	  complexity	  of	  the	  company.	  	  The	  following	  section	  
describes	  various	  approaches	  to	  four	  of	  the	  seven	  elements	  of	  the	  SMS.	  
The	  assessment	  of	  SMS	  requires	  more	  detective	  work	  than	  other	  types	  
of	  inspection.	  There	  is	  the	  requirement	  for	  the	  inspector	  to	  identify	  the	  
evidence	  which	  satisfies	  them	  that	  the	  system	  is	  appropriate	  and	  
functions	  correctly	  and	  where	  necessary	  to	  show	  the	  deficiencies	  so	  as	  
to	  convince	  the	  operator	  that	  there	  are	  issues	  to	  be	  addressed.	  
	  
3.1 ORGANIZATION	  AND	  PERSONNEL	  	  
Some	  key	  aspects	  of	  the	  safety	  management	  system	  are	  embedded	  in	  
the	  organizational	  structure,	  including	  the	  assignment	  of	  roles	  and	  
responsibilities	  to	  job	  functions,	  identifying	  competency	  and	  training	  
needs	  of	  the	  persons	  assigned	  to	  the	  specific	  job	  functions,	  and	  
establishing	  the	  communication	  mechanisms	  for	  providing	  important	  
information	  across	  and	  up	  and	  down	  the	  organization.	  	  	  In	  effect,	  the	  
safety	  management	  system	  provides	  the	  essential	  infrastructure	  to	  
support	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  system.	  	  	  
	  
The	  following	  elements	  form	  the	  core	  of	  the	  safety	  management	  
system:	  
	  
• An	  informed	  leadership	  that	  monitors	  overall	  process	  safety	  
performance	  and	  supports	  decision	  making	  that	  takes	  account	  of	  
risk	  management	  needs.	  
• Linkage	  of	  accountability	  and	  ownership	  of	  specific	  risk	  
management	  outcomes	  to	  specific	  job	  functions	  
• A	  systematic	  process	  to	  communicate	  safety	  critical	  information	  
clearly	  and	  as	  necessary	  to	  involved	  staff,	  management	  and	  
contract	  workers,	  e.g.,	  when	  a	  change	  or	  action	  may	  affect	  hazard	  




control	  in	  a	  certain	  area,	  an	  abnormal	  situation,	  near	  miss	  
occurrence,	  or	  other	  potential	  accident	  precursor,	  etc.	  
• A	  systematic	  approach	  to	  training,	  including	  the	  identification	  of	  
necessary	  competencies	  (those	  which	  exist	  and	  those	  which	  are	  
needed)	  and	  delivery	  of	  training	  as	  appropriate.	  
• Employee	  involvement	  such	  that	  personnel	  are	  consulted	  in	  the	  
planning	  of	  training,	  and	  the	  development	  and	  writing	  of	  
procedures,	  hazard	  identification,	  and	  related	  activities.	  	  Employee	  
involvement	  drives	  ownership	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  allows	  
experienced	  staff	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  reality	  check	  for	  various	  procedures	  
and	  analyses	  under	  development.	  
• Mechanisms	  to	  foster	  awareness	  among	  all	  personnel	  of	  hazard	  
identification	  and	  control	  measures	  associated	  with	  their	  work,	  
such	  as	  actively	  providing	  information	  on	  the	  hazards	  involved	  with	  
carrying	  out	  activities	  with	  hazardous	  substances	  and	  suitable	  
measures	  to	  minimize	  the	  risk	  and	  impact	  of	  an	  accident.	  
	  
Special	  considerations	  for	  different	  types	  of	  sites	  
Large	  enterprises	  
In	  large	  enterprises	  there	  is	  an	  expectation	  that	  the	  prevention	  of	  major	  
accidents	  should	  be	  a	  key	  aspect	  of	  the	  organization.	  Inspectors	  stated	  
that	  they	  would	  expect	  to	  see	  evidence	  that	  prevention	  of	  major	  
accidents	  would	  be	  formally	  included	  in	  the	  agenda	  of	  management	  
meetings	  at	  the	  site.	  If	  the	  inspector	  was	  not	  allowed	  to	  see	  the	  
documents	  (e.g.,	  due	  to	  business	  confidentiality)	  then	  a	  description	  of	  
the	  topics	  discussed	  should	  be	  shared	  by	  the	  company.	  	  The	  
documentation	  should	  also	  indicate	  who	  attended	  these	  meetings.	  	  
Many	  inspectors	  felt	  that	  large	  companies	  with	  small	  sites	  were	  
generally	  more	  compliant	  with	  requirements	  than	  smaller	  companies.	  
Large	  companies	  tend	  to	  carry	  out	  very	  detailed	  risk	  assessments.	  What	  
they	  have	  then	  done	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  assessment	  is	  integrated	  into	  
their	  daily	  work.	  




SMEs	  and	  lower-­‐tier	  establishments	  
The	  core	  competence	  of	  SMEs	  and	  lower-­‐tier	  establishments	  is	  not	  
usually	  process	  safety.	  	  Moreover,	  in	  lower-­‐tier	  establishments	  there	  
are	  often	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  economic	  activities.	  Typical	  for	  these	  types	  of	  
facilities	  are	  the	  food	  and	  beverage	  industries	  and	  warehousing.	  Major	  
accident	  hazards	  are	  not	  perceived	  as	  being	  directly	  related	  to	  the	  core	  
business	  activities.	  This	  means	  that	  there	  may	  not	  be	  any	  formal	  safety	  
management	  system	  in	  place,	  which	  presents	  a	  challenge.	  It	  is	  also	  
difficult	  where	  the	  focus	  of	  safety	  is	  on	  occupational	  health	  and	  safety	  
and	  not	  on	  chemical	  process	  safety.	  This	  type	  of	  establishment	  not	  only	  
needs	  the	  right	  personnel,	  but	  also	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  an	  understanding	  
among	  all	  staff	  of	  the	  risks	  presented	  by	  the	  hazardous	  activities.	  	  
Inspectors	  should	  be	  aware	  that	  many	  SMEs	  and	  lower-­‐tier	  sites	  can	  
have	  less	  awareness	  of	  safety	  in	  particular	  in	  regard	  to	  some	  of	  the	  
following	  issues:	  
• There	  is	  a	  particular	  concern	  in	  regard	  to	  adequate	  training	  of	  both	  
staff	  and	  contractors	  on	  the	  purpose,	  content	  and	  implementation	  
of	  safety	  management	  systems.	  In	  particular,	  subcontractors	  often	  
have	  no	  knowledge	  of	  Seveso-­‐type	  risks,	  presenting	  a	  huge	  
challenge	  to	  the	  process	  safety	  management	  system.	  
• Whilst	  training	  certification	  can	  be	  checked	  there	  is	  a	  need	  to	  look	  
at	  an	  operator’s	  management	  system	  horizontally,	  rather	  than	  a	  
fragmented	  approach,	  i.e.,	  looking	  at	  specific	  aspects	  of	  health	  and	  
safety	  in	  isolation.	  	  
• Often	  the	  health	  and	  safety	  expertise	  of	  SMEs	  is	  outsourced	  with	  a	  
reliance	  on	  certification	  to	  check	  the	  expertise.	  This	  is	  also	  a	  
problem	  when	  subcontracting.	  There	  is	  a	  need	  for	  operators	  to	  
become	  the	  “intelligent	  customer”.	  Where	  “health	  and	  safety”	  is	  
contracted	  out	  to	  a	  consultant	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  question	  how	  this	  
reflects	  what	  happens	  in	  the	  company,	  and	  how	  much	  is	  what	  the	  
consultant	  believes	  happens	  or	  even	  believes	  should	  happen.	  	  
• Generally	  when	  inspecting	  very	  small	  companies	  with	  consultant-­‐
delivered	  procedures	  it	  is	  best	  to	  talk	  to	  the	  employees	  to	  
understand	  the	  processes.	  




• It	  is	  important	  to	  identify	  the	  employees’	  awareness	  of	  the	  hazards	  
and	  how	  these	  hazards	  are	  reflected	  in	  the	  operating	  procedures.	  	  
The	  inspector	  should	  direct	  questions	  about	  the	  safety	  




When	  the	  SMS	  procedures	  have	  been	  outsourced	  
A	  serious	  concern	  amongst	  inspectors	  is	  that	  the	  development	  of	  the	  
SMS	  and	  writing	  of	  the	  documentation	  is	  often	  outsourced.	  	  This	  
paperwork	  then	  remains	  on	  the	  shelf.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  verify	  
implementation	  of	  the	  SMS	  at	  companies,	  for	  example,	  interviewing	  
employees,	  observing	  operations	  and	  noting	  accessibility	  and	  visibility	  
of	  safety	  information,	  following	  the	  paper	  trail	  for	  certain	  actions	  (e.g.,	  
audit	  and	  lessons	  learned	  follow-­‐up),	  etc.	  	  In	  all	  cases,	  it	  is	  not	  sufficient	  
to	  rely	  on	  written	  procedures	  but	  it	  is	  particular	  important	  to	  take	  a	  
very	  thorough	  approach	  to	  SMS	  verification	  when	  dealing	  with	  
employers	  whose	  SMS	  procedures	  are	  outsourced.	  
Employee	  training	  
The	  organization	  of	  personnel	  training	  is	  an	  important	  issue	  of	  the	  
general	  topic	  of	  “organization	  and	  personnel”.	  	  	  Both	  operator	  
employees	  and	  contractor	  employees	  need	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  process	  
safety	  issues	  and	  companies	  must	  monitor	  whether	  their	  procedures	  for	  
organizing	  and	  training	  their	  employees	  and	  organizing	  contractors	  are	  
functioning.	  	  	  
Some	  questions	  an	  inspector	  might	  ask	  of	  the	  operator	  in	  this	  regard	  
could	  be	  the	  following:	  	  
	  




CASE	  STUDY:	  RELEASE	  OF	  CARBON	  MONOXIDE	  
LEADING	  TO	  A	  FATAL	  ACCIDENT	  An	  accident	  in	  the	  steel	  processing	  industry	  at	  an	  upper-­‐tier	  Seveso	  establishment	  led	  to	  one	  fatality	  and	  two	  injured	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  carbon	  monoxide	  release	  during	  maintenance	  work	  by	  a	  contractor	  company	  on	  a	  gas	  cooler	  for	  converter	  gas.	  	  In	  the	  gas	  cooler	  cellar	  water	  fed	  from	  a	  mixing	  vessel	  was	  passed	  through	  a	  motor	  driven	  shut	  off	  valve	  and	  one	  of	  two	  parallel	  water	  filters	  to	  the	  gas	  cooler.	  Each	  of	  the	  water	  filters	  had	  a	  manual	  shut-­‐off	  valve	  before	  and	  after	  it	  to	  allow	  maintenance.	  Due	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  manual	  shut-­‐off	  valves	  to	  close	  fully	  due	  to	  the	  build-­‐up	  of	  sediment	  in	  the	  valve	  body	  water	  could	  flow	  out	  of	  the	  system	  (no	  hydrostatic	  seal)	  and	  converter	  gas	  could	  escape.	  Deficiencies	  in	  the	  safety	  management	  system	  which	  were	  identified	  are:	  
• Shut-­‐down	  and	  permit-­‐to-­‐work	  rules	  exist,	  but	  different	  safety	  check	  lists	  exist	  and	  the	  results	  are	  dependent	  on	  which	  check	  list	  is	  chosen.	  
• The	  foreman	  of	  the	  contractor	  company	  was	  trained	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  hazards	  of	  gas	  (carbon	  monoxide),	  however,	  he	  received	  no	  information	  as	  to	  how	  to	  respond	  to	  a	  gas	  alarm.	  
• There	  was	  no	  documented	  training	  of	  the	  other	  two	  contractor	  employees.	  
• The	  internal	  emergency	  plan	  contained	  no	  description	  of	  the	  action	  to	  be	  taken	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  carbon	  monoxide	  gas	  alarm.	  
	  




	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
• The	  carbon	  monoxide	  gas	  alarm	  in	  the	  control	  room	  was	  poorly	  designed	  from	  an	  ergonomic	  perspective.	  Following	  the	  accident	  the	  measures	  which	  were	  taken	  included:	  
• A	  siphon	  water	  trap	  to	  prevent	  gas	  breaking	  through	  was	  installed.	  
• A	  separate	  display	  for	  gas	  alarms	  in	  the	  control	  room	  was	  also	  installed.	  
• Shut-­‐off	  valves	  were	  replaced.	  
• The	  operating	  procedure	  was	  revised	  to	  reflect	  the	  lessons	  learned	  from	  the	  accident.	  
• The	  safety	  check-­‐list	  was	  revised.	  
• The	  shutdown	  and	  permit-­‐to-­‐work	  rules	  were	  revised.	  
• Spot	  checks	  on	  contractor	  employees	  were	  implemented	  as	  standard	  practice	  for	  contractor	  training.	  
• At	  upper-­‐tier	  establishments,	  training	  for	  all	  external	  workers	  and	  visitors	  was	  established	  with	  regard	  to:	  
o Dangerous	  chemicals	  used	  
o Safety	  measures	  
o Reporting	  and	  emergency	  muster	  locations	  	  
• It	  became	  mandatory	  that	  contractor	  training	  on	  safety	  measures	  for	  workers	  is	  documented.	  	  
	  





• How	  are	  decisions	  made	  about	  who	  should	  be	  trained	  and	  what	  the	  
training	  should	  cover?	  
• To	  what	  extent	  are	  employees	  trained	  to	  understand	  hazards?	  	  
What	  is	  the	  minimum	  safety	  training	  required	  for	  all	  employees?	  	  
What	  additional	  safety	  training	  is	  offered	  to	  some	  job	  functions,	  if	  
any,	  and	  for	  which	  functions	  specifically?	  
• How	  is	  training	  organized?	  	  Is	  there	  both	  routine	  training	  provided	  
at	  regular	  frequencies	  as	  well	  as	  ad	  hoc	  training?	  	  How	  often	  is	  
safety	  training	  targeted	  or	  a	  part	  of	  various	  training	  events?	  
• Are	  safety	  topics	  regularly	  included	  in	  all	  types	  of	  training?	  	  Are	  
there	  training	  opportunities	  for	  addressing	  specific	  safety	  issues	  
(e.g.,	  hazard	  awareness)	  and	  if	  so,	  what	  are	  they?	  	  
	  
Contractor	  communication	  and	  training	  
It	  is	  necessary	  to	  discuss	  with	  the	  contractor	  team	  about	  their	  work	  and	  
associated	  safety	  procedures.	  	  Just	  as	  for	  employees,	  the	  operator	  
should	  proactively	  provide	  contractor	  employees	  complete	  information	  
on	  the	  hazards	  associated	  with	  their	  work	  and	  control	  measures	  to	  
minimise	  the	  risk	  of	  accident.	  	  They	  should	  also	  be	  informed	  about	  what	  
to	  do	  if	  they	  recognize	  an	  unsafe	  or	  abnormal	  situation,	  if	  a	  near	  miss	  or	  
accidental	  release	  occurs,	  and	  in	  an	  emergency.	  	  There	  also	  needs	  to	  be	  
sufficient	  contractual,	  legal	  control	  regulating	  how	  the	  contractor	  fits	  
into	  the	  safety	  structure	  of	  the	  customer.	  Inspectors	  should	  be	  able	  to	  
recognize	  whether	  the	  operator’s	  SMS	  and	  the	  contractor’s	  safety	  
procedures	  are	  consistent.	  Inspectors	  may	  wish	  to	  look	  at	  contractor	  
certification,	  e.g.	  SCC4,	  as	  a	  confirmation	  of	  competence.	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Defining	  and	  demonstrating	  success	  
	  
Common	  success	  factors	  
	  
The	  ease	  with	  which	  the	  company	  empowers	  the	  organization	  and	  its	  
personnel	  to	  maintain	  and	  continuously	  improve	  safety	  often	  depends	  
on	  the	  following	  key	  factors:	  
	  
• The	  size	  and	  core	  activity	  of	  the	  company.	  	  Chemical	  
manufacturing	  sites	  generally	  have	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  
the	  need	  to	  understand	  chemical	  hazards	  and	  risks	  than	  those	  
industries	  where	  the	  chemical	  hazard	  is	  an	  ancillary	  operation	  
to	  the	  main	  economic	  activity.	  
	  
• Sufficient	  resources	  allocated	  to	  safety	  critical	  activities.	  	  Such	  
resources	  include	  not	  only	  financial	  means,	  but	  also	  time,	  
staffing	  levels,	  and	  empowerment	  of	  those	  tasked	  with	  
carrying	  out	  the	  activities.	  
	  
• The	  involvement	  of	  contractors	  and	  temporary	  workers.	  	  When	  
contractors	  frequently	  perform	  work	  on	  site,	  it	  creates	  an	  
added	  challenge	  for	  safety	  management.	  	  Contractors	  are	  not	  
particularly	  bound	  into	  the	  company	  safety	  culture	  and	  there	  is	  
only	  a	  limited	  degree	  to	  which	  individual	  performance	  
standards	  and	  behaviours	  can	  be	  reformed	  and	  adapted	  to	  
reflect	  the	  safety	  climate	  onsite	  more	  closely.	  
	  
• Leadership.	  	  Management	  commitment	  must	  be	  embedded	  at	  
the	  very	  top	  of	  the	  organization	  and	  be	  present	  throughout	  the	  
whole	  management	  chain.	  	  Such	  leadership	  involves	  not	  only	  
communicating	  expectations,	  but	  also	  personally	  behaving	  
accordingly,	  and	  listening	  and	  responding	  to	  feedback	  from	  
employees.	  
	  




• Availability	  and	  involvement	  of	  employee	  representatives.	  	  
They	  can	  play	  an	  important	  positive	  role	  in	  making	  the	  SMS	  
work	  as	  it	  should,	  particularly	  in	  larger	  organizations,	  because	  
they	  have	  established	  mechanisms	  for	  exchanging	  and	  
channelling	  information	  in	  both	  directions	  between	  
management	  and	  the	  workforce.	  
	  
	  
What	  does	  success	  look	  like?	  
	  
The	  following	  are	  examples	  volunteered	  by	  participants	  from	  their	  
inspection	  experience:	  
	  
•	   Safety	  is	  a	  management	  agenda	  item	  –	  it	  appears	  as	  a	  regular	  and	  
important	  item	  at	  managerial	  meetings,	  not	  just	  safety	  meetings.	  
•	   Major	  hazards	  are	  addressed	  systematically	  in	  identifying	  
competency,	  training,	  procedures	  and	  control	  measures.	  
•	   Safety	  critical	  tasks	  have	  been	  systematically	  identified	  and	  
documented.	  
•	   There	  is	  sufficient	  evidence	  that	  employees	  and	  contractors	  are	  
involved	  in	  the	  development	  and	  delivery	  of	  training	  and	  
procedures.	  
•	   Training	  records	  reflect	  the	  implementation	  of	  training	  to	  address	  
the	  identified	  needs	  and	  testing	  of	  competence	  is	  routinely	  
conducted	  as	  follow-­‐up	  to	  training	  or	  when	  replacing	  staff	  in	  a	  
safety	  critical	  function.	  
•	   Interviews	  with	  employees	  confirm	  that	  procedures	  described	  in	  
written	  documents	  are	  understood	  and	  followed.	  
•	   Selection	  and	  management	  of	  contractors	  and	  temporary	  workers	  
reflects	  competency	  requirements	  identified	  for	  safety	  critical	  tasks	  
(certification,	  qualifications	  and	  experience).	  
•	   Contractor	  supervision	  and	  follow-­‐up	  is	  a	  routine	  part	  of	  company	  
procedure	  and	  appropriately	  includes	  attention	  to	  risk	  
management	  and	  safe	  work	  practices	  (the	  intelligent	  customer).	  
	  




3.2 IDENTIFICATION	  AND	  EVALUATION	  OF	  MAJOR	  
HAZARDS	  AND	  RISKS	  
Risk	  assessment	  is	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  the	  SMS.	  	  It	  is	  a	  continuous	  
process	  in	  the	  global	  life-­‐cycle	  of	  a	  company.	  	  	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  
identification	  and	  evaluation	  of	  major	  hazards	  and	  risks	  is	  to	  ensure	  
proper	  control	  of	  low	  probability,	  high	  consequence	  events.	  
The	  risk	  assessment	  consists	  of	  several	  parts.	  	  The	  inspector	  should	  
verify	  that	  each	  of	  the	  tasks	  has	  been	  conducted	  systematically	  and	  
comprehensively.	  	  Hazard	  identification	  is	  the	  first	  part	  but	  the	  risk	  
assessment	  does	  not	  end	  there.	  	  The	  operator	  needs	  to	  complete	  the	  
other	  stages	  of	  the	  risk	  assessment:	  	  consequence	  assessment,	  risk	  
ranking	  and	  evaluation.	  	  	  
There	  are	  also	  clear	  requirements	  within	  the	  Directive	  that	  an	  operator	  
must	  be	  able	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  appropriate	  control	  measures	  have	  
been	  taken	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  risk	  assessment.	  	  	  It	  is	  
therefore	  important	  to	  check	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  risk	  assessment	  and	  that	  
the	  staff	  assigned	  to	  the	  task	  has	  the	  necessary	  competency	  for	  risk	  
assessment	  in	  all	  roles.	  The	  quality	  of	  the	  control	  measures	  themselves	  
should	  be	  evaluated	  separately	  from	  the	  risk	  assessment	  with	  criteria	  
relevant	  for	  the	  specific	  measure.	  	  	  
To	  ensure	  an	  objective	  and	  comprehensive	  risk	  assessment,	  the	  
company	  must	  adopt	  a	  systematic	  approach	  and	  apply	  suitable	  
methods	  for	  hazard	  identification,	  consequence	  assessment	  and	  the	  
final	  assessment	  and	  ranking.	  	  These	  choices	  need	  to	  take	  account	  of	  
the	  processes	  involved	  and	  the	  size	  and	  complexity	  of	  the	  company.	  The	  
process	  for	  the	  identification	  and	  evaluation	  of	  major	  hazards	  and	  risks	  
must	  include	  a	  frequency	  for	  reassessing	  the	  process	  as	  well	  as	  
situations	  that	  might	  trigger	  a	  reassessment	  (e.g.	  accidents,	  new	  
knowledge,	  modifications)	  outside	  the	  scheduled	  intervals.	  	  
In	  most	  Seveso	  countries,	  inspectors	  do	  not	  approve	  the	  risk	  
assessment,	  but	  check	  that	  it	  is	  systematic,	  complete	  and	  an	  accurate	  
reflection	  of	  the	  existing	  situation.	  	  Inspectors	  can	  conduct	  spot	  checks	  
on	  specific	  processes	  (by	  observation,	  looking	  at	  records,	  talking	  to	  




employees,	  etc.)	  to	  verify	  the	  details	  of	  the	  hazard	  identified	  as	  well	  as	  
an	  associated	  scenario	  (if	  any).	  	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  ascertain	  that	  all	  
hazards	  have	  been	  identified	  by	  exploring	  the	  operator’s	  rationale	  and	  
process	  for	  identifying	  hazards	  and	  ranking	  risks.	  	  	  
The	  competent	  authority	  should	  make	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  operator	  is	  
ultimately	  responsible	  for	  the	  risk	  assessment.	  	  If	  a	  risk	  assessment	  is	  
approved	  as	  a	  competent	  authority,	  then	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  of	  incurring	  
blame	  if	  something	  was	  missed	  which	  led	  to	  an	  accident.	  	  	  
	  
Special	  considerations	  for	  different	  types	  of	  sites	  
Upper-­‐tier	  sites	  	  
At	  upper-­‐tier	  establishments,	  the	  hazard	  identification	  and	  risk	  
assessment	  are	  often	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  company’s	  own	  personnel	  or	  by	  
a	  central	  service	  unit	  within	  a	  multi-­‐site	  or	  multinational	  concern.	  In	  
these	  cases,	  the	  following	  principles	  should	  be	  considered	  for	  the	  
Seveso	  inspection:	  
• It	  is	  of	  particular	  importance	  to	  justify	  the	  use	  of	  the	  particular	  
risk	  assessment	  technique	  (HAZOP,	  FMEA,	  LOPA,	  etc.)	  and	  to	  
assess	  the	  competency	  of	  the	  risk	  assessment	  team(s).	  	  
• The	  responsibilities	  of	  risk	  assessment	  dictate	  that	  the	  team	  
should	  possess	  sufficient	  knowledge	  and	  experience	  in	  the	  
operations	  under	  assessment	  and	  the	  necessary	  technical	  
competences	  for	  making	  such	  an	  assessment.	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  
they	  should	  include	  operating	  personnel,	  for	  example,	  at	  
foreman	  level,	  to	  make	  judgements	  with	  precise	  information	  on	  
how	  the	  plant	  is	  operated,	  along	  with	  experts	  from	  appropriate	  
engineering	  or	  other	  relevant	  competences.	  
• The	  site	  should	  be	  able	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  risk	  assessments	  
are	  updated	  and	  revised	  at	  appropriate	  intervals.	  The	  
establishment	  should	  have	  defined	  processes	  which	  set	  the	  
frequency	  of	  revision,	  considering	  potential	  external	  triggers	  	  




(e.g.,	  process	  changes,	  accidents,	  new	  knowledge,	  etc.)	  that	  
may	  make	  a	  revision	  necessary.	  
• There	  needs	  to	  be	  a	  clearly	  defined	  communication	  between	  
different	  risk	  assessment	  teams,	  since	  many	  large	  sites	  may	  
have	  different	  teams	  covering	  different	  processes.	  	  There	  
should	  also	  be	  a	  mechanism	  to	  communicate	  the	  risk	  control	  
measures	  in	  effect	  to	  all	  relevant	  units	  within	  the	  company,	  
how	  they	  work	  and	  the	  role	  of	  various	  staff	  members	  in	  
maintaining	  their	  functionality.	  	  
• Where	  the	  services	  of	  consultants	  are	  used,	  the	  site	  should	  have	  
established	  criteria	  regarding	  their	  competency	  and	  
qualifications	  and	  a	  well-­‐defined	  policy	  on	  the	  frequency	  and	  
nature	  of	  their	  interface	  with	  the	  company,	  with	  particular	  
attention	  to	  how	  results	  of	  assessment	  are	  interpreted	  to	  
implement	  recommendations	  for	  site	  risk	  management.	  
	  
Lower-­‐tier	  sites	  
For	  lower-­‐tier	  establishments,	  it	  is	  important	  for	  inspectors	  to	  
understand	  how	  the	  risk	  assessment	  is	  organized	  as	  a	  system	  as	  well	  as	  
how	  it	  is	  executed.	  	  Some	  important	  points	  relate	  to	  the	  tendency	  in	  
lower-­‐tier	  establishments	  to	  rely	  heavily	  on	  the	  work	  of	  consultants.	  
This	  practice	  raises	  questions	  on	  the	  degree	  of	  involvement	  of	  the	  
company	  in	  the	  risk	  assessment	  process	  as	  well	  as	  imposes	  a	  particular	  
importance	  on	  the	  competency	  of	  the	  consultants	  involved.	  	  It	  also	  
implies	  a	  need	  for	  extra	  attention	  to	  how	  consultants	  are	  selected	  and	  
how	  their	  tasks	  are	  defined.	  	  In	  particular:	  	  




CASE	  STUDY:	  	  CARBON	  DISULPHIDE	  TANK	  
EXPLOSION	  An	  explosion	  occurred	  2.9.2009	  in	  a	  carbon	  disulphide	  tank	  while	  subcontracted	  employees	  were	  washing	  it	  out.	  Two	  employees	  were	  injured,	  one	  of	  them	  sustaining	  bad	  burns.	  The	  contributory	  factors	  can	  be	  considered	  in	  terms	  of	  various	  levels	  in	  a	  systems	  approach,	  using	  an	  AcciMap.	  At	  a	  societal	  level:	  chemical	  safety	  legislation	  in	  Finland	  is	  inadequate	  in	  bankruptcy	  cases.	  At	  the	  company	  level:	  The	  facility	  was	  bankrupt,	  the	  plant	  was	  no	  longer	  functioning	  and	  the	  personnel	  had	  been	  decreased.	  In	  addition	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  cleaning	  contract	  were	  insufficient.	  At	  the	  level	  of	  the	  plant	  management	  /	  co-­‐operation	  with	  the	  plant	  manager:	  This	  was	  the	  first	  time	  that	  nitrogen	  had	  been	  used	  when	  cleaning	  the	  tank;	  the	  subcontractor	  had	  no	  experience	  of	  cleaning	  a	  carbon	  disulphide	  tank;	  there	  was	  inadequate	  risk	  analysis,	  inadequate	  working	  procedures	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  supervision	  of	  the	  plant.	  
	  




	  At	  the	  level	  of	  the	  subcontractor’s	  actions,	  communication,	  instrumentation	  and	  design:	  Whilst	  nitrogen	  blanketing	  the	  tank	  the	  nitrogen	  flow	  was	  not	  measured,	  the	  oxygen	  content	  was	  not	  measured	  and	  a	  small	  quantity	  of	  carbon	  disulphide	  was	  still	  inside	  the	  tank.	  Following	  the	  washing	  there	  was	  no	  protective	  water	  layer	  left.	  The	  length	  of	  the	  washing	  hose	  had	  not	  been	  measured	  which	  meant	  that	  the	  nozzle	  could	  impact	  with	  the	  wall	  of	  the	  tank.	  At	  the	  lowest	  level,	  the	  incident,	  conditions	  and	  physical	  factors:	  an	  explosive	  gas-­‐air	  mixture	  had	  evolved	  which	  came	  into	  contact	  with	  an	  ignition	  source	  leading	  to	  an	  explosion	  with	  a	  pressure	  wave	  and	  flames.	  This	  resulted	  in	  two	  injured	  and	  the	  partial	  collapse	  of	  the	  building.	  Carbon	  disulphide	  is	  a	  hazardous	  substance	  	  with	  a	  flash	  point	  of	  –	  30	  °C,	  an	  explosive	  range	  of	  1	  %	  -­‐	  50	  %,	  the	  self	  ignition	  temperature	  is	  100	  °C	  and	  the	  ignition	  energy	  very	  low.	  The	  explosion	  was	  caused	  by	  inadequate	  nitrogen	  blanketing	  of	  the	  tank.	  The	  working	  procedures	  were	  inadequate.	  Whilst	  the	  subcontractor	  had	  assessed	  the	  occupational	  safety	  (health)	  hazard	  of	  the	  washing	  procedure	  the	  process	  safety	  hazards	  had	  been	  neglected.	  The	  likelihood	  of	  an	  explosion	  had	  not	  been	  analysed	  in	  detail.	  





• As	  lower-­‐tier	  sites	  may	  have	  a	  lack	  of	  risk	  assessment	  skills	  
within	  their	  own	  staff	  there	  is	  a	  greater	  possibility	  that	  they	  
will	  be	  less	  expert	  in	  choosing	  the	  proper	  consultants.	  	  To	  
ensure	  the	  necessary	  competence	  is	  hired,	  lower-­‐tier	  sites	  
need	  to	  be	  attentive	  to	  consultant	  qualifications	  and	  
experience,	  and	  the	  inspector	  should	  look	  for	  signs	  that	  good	  
criteria	  have	  been	  established,	  e.g.,	  a	  requirement	  for	  
accreditation	  by	  a	  professional	  association	  or	  other	  credential.	  	  
• Lower-­‐tier	  sites	  often	  are	  faced	  with	  contractors	  who	  have	  the	  
necessary	  competence	  but	  are	  not	  familiar	  or	  aware	  of	  the	  
range	  of	  operating	  conditions	  (normal	  and	  abnormal).	  	  Hence,	  
close	  co-­‐operation	  between	  the	  site	  and	  the	  contractor	  are	  
vital	  to	  an	  effective	  execution	  of	  the	  risk	  assessment.	  	  Both	  the	  
operator	  and	  the	  consultant	  should	  invest	  considerable	  effort	  
in	  identifying	  the	  key	  aspects	  of	  the	  process	  relevant	  to	  the	  risk	  
assessment.	  
• Lower-­‐tier	  sites	  may	  apply	  strict	  limits	  to	  the	  scope	  of	  work	  
assigned	  to	  the	  contractor.	  Inspectors	  should	  be	  attentive	  to	  
potential	  gaps	  in	  the	  risk	  assessment	  performed	  by	  the	  
consultant.	  	  The	  consultant	  may	  be	  given	  only	  a	  restricted	  
mandate	  to	  assess	  the	  effects	  of	  changes	  or	  proposed	  changes	  
on	  the	  hazards	  and	  risks	  within	  the	  establishment,	  for	  example,	  
in	  which	  situation,	  some	  processes	  and	  risks	  on	  the	  site	  might	  











Small	  and	  medium	  enterprises	  
As	  with	  many	  lower-­‐tier	  sites,	  the	  risk	  assessment	  for	  SMEs	  is	  usually	  
carried	  out	  by	  a	  consultant	  since	  also	  most	  SMEs	  have	  limited	  expertise	  
in	  conducting	  a	  risk	  assessment.	  	  Hence,	  similar	  considerations	  as	  
described	  for	  lower-­‐tier	  sites	  apply	  to	  SMEs	  regarding	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  
consultant,	  the	  scope	  of	  work	  assigned	  to	  the	  consultant,	  and	  the	  
necessity	  for	  a	  highly	  collaborative	  relationship	  between	  consultant	  and	  
operator.	  
In	  addition,	  the	  relative	  size	  and	  type	  of	  operation	  should	  be	  taken	  into	  
account	  in	  both	  defining	  and	  executing	  the	  risk	  assessment.	  	  The	  
following	  considerations	  generally	  are	  specifically	  relevant	  to	  SMEs:	  
• The	  method	  of	  risk	  assessment	  needs	  to	  be	  appropriate	  to	  the	  
level	  of	  risk	  and	  to	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  establishment.	  	  Small	  
sites	  with	  few	  processes	  may	  require	  only	  a	  simple	  
methodology.	  	  Some	  organizations	  have	  also	  issued	  guidance	  
and	  toolkits	  on	  hazard	  identification	  and	  risk	  assessment	  of	  
SMEs	  (e.g.,	  the	  International	  Labour	  Organization,	  the	  
International	  Council	  for	  Chemical	  Associations,	  etc.).	  
• Likewise,	  recommendations	  for	  control	  measures	  should	  be	  
developed	  that	  can	  be	  effective	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
operator’s	  resources	  and	  expertise.	  	  	  
• The	  assessment	  should	  establish	  a	  clear	  link	  between	  the	  
recommended	  control	  measures	  and	  the	  identified	  risks.	  	  A	  
good	  practice	  is	  to	  present	  the	  identified	  risks	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  
table	  together	  with	  their	  appropriate	  control	  measures.	  	  For	  
example,	  the	  maintenance	  and	  inspection	  schedules	  should	  
immediately	  be	  placed	  alongside	  the	  findings	  from	  risks	  










The	  role	  of	  management	  
Top	  management	  should	  be	  involved	  in	  the	  risk	  assessment	  at	  some	  
level,	  or	  at	  least	  be	  aware	  that	  risk	  assessments	  are	  being	  carried	  out,	  
ensuring	  follow-­‐up	  on	  the	  outcomes	  of	  risk.	  	  In	  particular,	  since	  the	  
management	  is	  responsible	  for	  managing	  resources,	  by	  necessity	  it	  
plays	  a	  role	  in	  ensuring	  adequate	  resources	  are	  allocated	  to	  maintain	  
the	  proper	  control	  measures	  to	  address	  the	  risks.	  	  Prioritisation	  of	  
resources	  in	  this	  regard	  should	  also	  be	  linked	  with	  prioritization	  of	  
control	  measures	  based	  on	  the	  risk	  assessment.	  	  	  	  
The	  role	  of	  management	  and	  level	  of	  involvement	  may	  depend	  on	  the	  
size	  of	  the	  site	  and	  also	  the	  size	  of	  the	  company.	  	  Top	  management	  in	  a	  
large	  scale	  enterprise	  is	  usually	  very	  complex.	  	  For	  such	  sites	  the	  
leadership’s	  role	  is	  normally	  to	  assign	  responsibilities	  to	  operational	  
management	  for	  conducting	  the	  risk	  assessment	  and	  implementing	  
resulting	  recommendations.	  It	  is	  then	  operational	  management	  that	  
should	  establish	  the	  risk	  assessment	  objectives	  and	  ensure	  
implementation.	  	  	  While	  top	  management	  do	  not	  have	  to	  review	  the	  
results	  of	  every	  risk	  assessment,	  the	  top	  management	  need	  to	  know	  
what	  the	  main	  risks	  are,	  and	  which	  gaps	  or	  operating	  risks	  exist	  in	  their	  
installation.	  The	  safety	  management	  system	  needs	  to	  assure	  that	  there	  
are	  processes	  that	  assure	  sufficient	  communication	  and	  feedback	  
processes	  Inspectors	  need	  to	  ask	  these	  questions.	  
The	  relevance	  of	  accident	  lessons	  learned	  to	  the	  risk	  
assessment	  
It	  is	  useful	  for	  the	  inspector	  to	  ask	  the	  company	  whether	  it	  has	  
researched	  past	  accidents	  in	  conducting	  the	  risk	  assessment.	  	  Relevant	  
findings	  from	  past	  accidents	  should	  be	  used	  as	  input	  since	  the	  lessons	  
learned	  often	  influence	  and	  provide	  new	  information	  to	  improve	  
standards	  and	  codes	  of	  practice.	  	  This	  area	  of	  inquiry	  is	  of	  particular	  
importance	  because	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  awareness	  outside	  of	  the	  large	  
chemical	  and	  petrochemical	  companies	  about	  previous	  accidents	  and	  
their	  findings	  and	  the	  lessons	  learnt	  from	  them.	  	  Thus,	  outside	  of	  the	  
major	  actors	  in	  these	  two	  sectors,	  the	  resources	  for	  learning	  from	  




accidents	  are	  not	  used,	  even	  though	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  lessons	  
learned	  are	  not	  specific	  to	  a	  particular	  industry	  but	  would	  apply	  to	  any	  
site’s	  safety	  management	  system.	  	  	  
	  
Defining	  and	  demonstrating	  success	  
Success	  factors	  
• Competence.	  	  Large	  companies	  often	  have	  the	  advantage	  of	  
maintaining	  in-­‐house	  competence	  in	  performing	  risk	  
assessments.	  	  However,	  other	  sites	  will	  have	  to	  outsource	  the	  
risk	  assessment	  and	  in	  these	  cases	  it	  is	  important	  for	  the	  
operator	  to	  have	  precise	  understanding	  of	  what	  qualifications	  
are	  required	  to	  perform	  the	  job	  well	  and	  hire	  only	  consultants	  
that	  show	  evidence	  of	  having	  these	  qualifications.	  
• Use	  of	  experience	  and	  feedback.	  The	  assessment	  needs	  to	  take	  
account	  of	  and	  use	  feedback	  from	  past	  experience	  on	  site	  as	  
well	  as	  relevant	  information	  from	  external	  sources.	  	  Onsite	  
sources	  of	  feedback	  include	  the	  history	  of	  past	  accidents	  and	  
near-­‐misses,	  findings	  from	  inspections	  and	  audits,	  and	  
maintenance	  records.	  	  Involvement	  of	  site	  employees	  in	  the	  
development	  of	  the	  risk	  assessment	  can	  help	  ensure	  that	  the	  
relevant	  information	  is	  communicated	  for	  this	  purpose.	  	  
Lessons	  learned	  from	  accidents	  in	  the	  same	  industry	  or	  sites	  
with	  similar	  processes	  should	  also	  be	  taken	  into	  account.	  	  
Potential	  domino	  effects	  should	  also	  be	  considered	  in	  both	  
directions,	  that	  is,	  as	  an	  incoming	  risk	  from	  nearby	  
establishments	  (triggering	  an	  onsite	  accident	  sequence),	  or	  as	  
a	  risk	  imposed	  from	  the	  site	  on	  nearby	  establishments	  if	  the	  
consequences	  of	  an	  onsite	  accident	  might	  affect	  them.	  
• Ownership	  of	  the	  risk	  assessment.	  	  Site	  management	  must	  take	  
on	  board	  the	  outcomes	  from	  the	  risk	  assessment,	  including	  
appropriate	  follow-­‐up	  on	  recommendations.	  




• Awareness	  and	  communication	  of	  risks.	  	  The	  site	  management	  
must	  take	  responsibility	  to	  communicate	  the	  risks	  and	  control	  
measures	  identified	  in	  the	  risk	  assessment	  to	  all	  personnel	  who	  
may	  have	  a	  role	  in	  managing	  risk	  and	  ensuring	  the	  control	  
measures	  function.	  	  It	  is	  essential	  that	  all	  employees	  are	  aware	  
of	  the	  risks	  and	  consequences	  related	  to	  their	  activities	  within	  
the	  establishment.	  	  Hence,	  this	  communication	  should	  equally	  
cover	  departments	  in	  supportive	  roles,	  such	  as	  procurement	  
and	  human	  resources	  and	  also	  the	  interfaces	  with	  contractors.	  	  
What	  does	  success	  look	  like?	  
The	  following	  are	  examples	  volunteered	  by	  participants	  from	  their	  
inspection	  experience:	  
• Risk	  assessment	  drives	  control	  processes	  for	  managing	  all	  of	  
the	  following:	  
o Operating	  procedures	  
o Equipment	  
o Training	  
o Inspections	  and	  maintenance	  
o Emergency	  planning	  
• Identification	  and	  evaluation	  of	  major	  hazards	  and	  risks	  are	  
clearly	  proportionate	  in	  the	  site’s	  risk	  management	  approach.	  
• Employees	  and	  contractors	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  risks	  associated	  
with	  their	  work	  and	  their	  role	  in	  controlling	  them.	  
• The	  site	  risk	  assessment	  and	  individual	  process	  risk	  
assessments	  are	  fully	  documented,	  including	  the	  process	  
followed,	  results	  and	  information	  used	  to	  produce	  the	  
outcome.	  	  Control	  measures	  and	  associated	  actions	  
recommended	  by	  the	  risk	  assessment	  should	  be	  documented	  
including	  follow-­‐up	  (when	  and	  how	  they	  were	  implemented).	  




• There	  is	  a	  systematic	  selection	  and	  application	  of	  risk	  
assessment	  methods	  and	  the	  consequence	  analysis	  was	  
conducted	  by	  a	  competent	  expert.	  
• The	  off-­‐site	  risk	  is	  communicated	  transparently	  to	  senior	  
management	  and	  all	  stakeholders.	  
	  
3.3 MANAGEMENT	  OF	  CHANGE	  (MOC)	  
Seveso	  site	  operators	  often	  are	  not	  sufficiently	  aware	  that	  failure	  in	  the	  
management	  of	  change	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  common	  causes	  of	  accidents.	  	  
Every	  accident	  that	  occurs	  is	  proof	  that	  the	  safety	  management	  system	  
is	  not	  100%	  working	  to	  control	  the	  risks	  as	  it	  should.	  	  Sometimes	  the	  
accident	  may	  be	  caused	  by	  latent	  errors,	  that	  is,	  from	  a	  change	  that	  was	  
implemented	  many	  years	  ago	  but	  never	  communicated	  or	  documented	  
or	  assessed	  in	  any	  way,	  and	  the	  associated	  risk	  only	  became	  evident	  
when	  the	  accident	  occurred.	  	  	  
Thus,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  both	  small	  and	  large	  sites	  should	  establish	  a	  
procedure	  for	  management	  of	  change.	  	  The	  procedure	  should	  exist	  as	  a	  
formal	  written	  policy	  with	  appropriate	  guidance	  as	  to	  what	  changes	  
should	  be	  considered	  for	  the	  procedure.	  	  The	  policy	  should	  also	  define	  
what	  is	  a	  safety	  relevant	  change.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  process	  for	  
establishing	  that	  a	  change	  is	  a	  safety	  relevant	  change	  should	  be	  very	  
clear.	  	  Safety	  relevant	  changes	  should	  be	  considered	  as	  any	  change	  that	  
can	  potentially	  change	  the	  process	  or	  site	  risk	  profile.	  	  Hence,	  a	  safety	  
relevant	  change	  is	  any	  type	  of	  change	  that	  could	  have	  impact	  on	  the	  
operation,	  including	  equipment,	  process,	  personnel,	  organizational,	  
temporary	  and	  permanent	  changes,	  and	  changes	  arising	  from	  
regulatory	  changes	  (e.g.,	  ATEX).	  	  However,	  the	  policy	  should	  also	  give	  
criteria	  for	  what	  kinds	  of	  changes	  do	  not	  need	  to	  undergo	  the	  MoC	  
process.	  	  As	  a	  general	  rule,	  if	  a	  piece	  of	  equipment	  is	  maintained	  within	  
the	  operating	  envelope,	  then	  such	  a	  change	  need	  not	  be	  considered	  a	  
change.	  	  	  
	  
	  




In	  addition,	  the	  MoC	  policy	  should	  address	  all	  the	  following	  elements:	  
• Each	  responsibility,	  that	  is	  each	  step	  of	  the	  procedure,	  should	  be	  
assigned	  to	  specific	  job	  functions.	  	  	  	  These	  responsibilities	  should	  
include	  authorization,	  initiation,	  and	  approval	  of	  the	  risk	  
assessment	  process	  and	  also	  for	  the	  change	  process	  selected	  
following	  the	  risk	  assessment.	  The	  policy	  should	  also	  include	  a	  
process	  to	  verify	  that	  the	  change	  was	  implemented	  as	  
recommended	  by	  the	  risk	  assessment	  with	  the	  recommended	  
control	  measures	  in	  place	  (if	  any)	  and	  that	  safe	  operation	  can	  take	  
place.	  
• The	  entire	  process	  should	  be	  transparent	  from	  the	  point	  that	  the	  
change	  has	  been	  identified	  as	  a	  potentially	  safety	  relevant	  change	  
all	  the	  way	  to	  the	  final	  step	  which	  should	  consist	  of	  verification	  that	  
the	  change	  has	  been	  implemented	  correctly.	  	  	  
• The	  required	  competencies	  of	  all	  involved	  in	  the	  MoC	  process	  
should	  also	  be	  specified.	  
• The	  system	  should	  address	  whether	  permanent	  changes	  and	  
temporary	  changes	  are	  handled	  differently	  –	  often	  permanent	  
changes	  are	  documented	  better	  than	  temporary	  ones.	  
• The	  policy	  should	  require	  documentation	  of	  the	  change	  and	  
verification	  that	  the	  change	  has	  been	  documented.	  	  All	  relevant	  
written	  operating	  procedures	  should	  be	  modified	  as	  necessary	  to	  
reflect	  the	  change.	  	  	  
• Changes	  to	  process	  drawings	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  MoC	  should	  be	  
considered	  as	  part	  of	  the	  documentation	  that	  may	  need	  
modification.	  Often	  accidents	  have	  occurred	  due	  to	  work	  being	  
carried	  out	  using	  an	  incorrect	  drawing.	  	  
• The	  process	  for	  communicating	  changes	  should	  be	  outlined,	  
including	  the	  specific	  job	  functions	  that	  should	  be	  informed	  and	  for	  
what	  purpose.	  
• The	  MoC	  process	  needs	  to	  clarify	  the	  point	  at	  which	  the	  change	  is	  
considered	  as	  completed,	  that	  is,	  when	  should	  the	  proper	  




authorization	  of	  a	  completed	  change	  take	  place,	  verifying	  that	  the	  
change	  physically	  conforms	  to	  the	  intended	  change	  and	  that	  it	  has	  
been	  documented.	  
	  
Special	  considerations	  for	  different	  types	  of	  sites	  
Upper-­‐tier	  sites	  
It	  is	  expected	  that	  the	  upper-­‐tier	  site	  will	  address	  changes	  in	  the	  risk	  
assessment	  process,	  “Have	  all	  risks	  been	  considered?”	  	  Also,	  it	  should	  
be	  clear	  what	  conditions	  or	  activities	  trigger	  the	  requirement	  for	  a	  risk	  
assessment.	  The	  risk	  assessment	  should	  not	  just	  consider	  the	  
implementation	  of	  the	  change,	  but	  also	  the	  work	  needed	  to	  effect	  the	  
change	  itself.	  	  
Lower-­‐tier	  sites	  
If	  a	  lower-­‐tier	  site	  does	  not	  belong	  to	  the	  chemical	  processing	  or	  
petrochemical	  sector,	  it	  may	  not	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  need	  and	  importance	  
of	  a	  management	  of	  change	  process.	  	  It	  may	  also	  be	  that	  the	  risk	  
assessment	  for	  a	  safety	  relevant	  change	  on	  many	  lower-­‐tier	  sites	  is	  
outsourced	  to	  a	  consultant	  and	  therefore,	  the	  MoC	  policy	  may	  
represent	  an	  extra	  inconvenience	  and/or	  added	  cost.	  	  	  
Small	  and	  medium	  enterprises	  
Implementing	  MoC	  is	  often	  a	  challenge	  in	  small	  companies	  because	  the	  
owner	  requires	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  flexibility	  and	  does	  not	  necessarily	  see	  
the	  need	  to	  consider	  the	  impacts	  of	  changes.	  Often	  there	  is	  no	  
documentation	  of	  changes	  in	  a	  small	  company.	  	  Moreover,	  small	  
operators	  may	  also	  try	  to	  avoid	  management	  of	  change	  due	  to	  the	  
added	  cost	  of	  the	  risk	  assessment	  or	  the	  potential	  increased	  cost	  of	  the	  
change	  following	  a	  risk	  assessment.	  
	  





Management	  of	  change	  and	  aging	  of	  installations	  
Aging	  of	  installations	  is	  not	  just	  a	  maintenance	  issue.	  Often	  equipment	  
may	  not	  be	  available	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons	  (e.g.,	  obsolete	  
technology,	  the	  supplier	  is	  no	  longer	  in	  business,	  etc.).	  	  Sometimes	  
equipment	  can	  deteriorate,	  for	  example,	  ultraviolet	  light	  will	  harden	  
plastic	  over	  time,	  stress	  loading	  of	  pressure	  vessels	  can	  weaken	  
equipment,	  or	  equipment	  simply	  reaches	  the	  end	  of	  its	  life.	  These	  types	  
of	  changes	  may	  require	  replacement	  of	  equipment	  whose	  function	  is	  
central	  to	  the	  process.	  	  	  Moreover,	  replacement	  of	  parts	  is	  often	  not	  
simply	  the	  exchange	  of	  one	  piece	  of	  equipment	  for	  another	  (like	  for	  
like).	  	  It	  may	  be	  an	  upgrade	  that	  imposes	  changes	  on	  interfacing	  parts	  of	  
the	  process	  or	  it	  may	  even	  require	  a	  process	  re-­‐design.	  	  The	  material	  
composition	  may	  have	  changed	  and	  may	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  downstream	  
processes.	  	  Once	  a	  piece	  of	  equipment	  changes	  the	  operating	  process,	  
this	  is	  an	  operational	  change.	  	  
	  
Personnel	  changes	  
When	  planning	  to	  assess	  organizational	  changes	  in	  inspections,	  the	  first	  
question	  the	  inspector	  should	  ask	  is	  whether	  the	  company	  carries	  out	  a	  
risk	  assessment	  for	  organizational	  changes.	  	  Inspectors	  should	  avoid	  the	  
temptation	  to	  view	  this	  as	  mainly	  a	  human	  resources	  issue.	  	  
Organizational	  change	  affects	  all	  departments	  and	  therefore,	  any	  
inspection	  of	  this	  aspect	  should	  view	  how	  the	  change	  is	  assessed	  from	  
the	  perspective	  of	  the	  entire	  operation	  of	  the	  site.	  	  There	  may	  be	  risks	  
of	  which	  human	  resources	  could	  not	  be	  aware	  (and	  they	  may	  not	  have	  
been	  identified	  if	  the	  management	  of	  change	  process	  was	  not	  
conducted).	  	  	  
The	  process	  of	  managing	  organization	  of	  change	  should	  include	  
identification	  of	  safety	  critical	  roles	  and	  the	  workload,	  competences	  and	  
specialised	  training	  associated	  with	  each	  role.	  	  	  An	  analysis	  should	  be	  
conducted	  in	  regard	  to	  how	  changes	  in	  staff	  and	  staff	  assignments	  to	  
identify	  potential	  risks	  and	  control	  measures.	  	  A	  targeted	  training	  




programme	  is	  not	  always	  sufficient	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  induced	  by	  the	  
change.	  	  The	  risk	  analysis	  should	  serve	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  determining	  
whether	  additional	  competency,	  training	  or	  a	  different	  workload	  
distribution	  is	  required.	  	  
Major	  organizational	  changes,	  such	  as	  those	  arising	  from	  mergers	  and	  
acquisitions	  or	  significant	  economic	  downturn,	  will	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  
the	  safety	  management	  system.	  	  As	  a	  general	  rule,	  if	  a	  plant	  is	  managed	  
with	  the	  same	  people,	  then	  it	  may	  have	  a	  better	  chance	  of	  running	  
smoothly	  despite	  the	  transition.	  	  However,	  if	  site	  management	  changes,	  
the	  impact	  of	  the	  change	  is	  much	  more	  difficult	  to	  assess	  and	  requires	  
relatively	  greater	  attention	  to	  the	  change	  process	  and	  potential	  risks,	  
from	  management	  and	  inspectors	  alike.	  
Aging	  of	  staff	  is	  a	  change	  which	  occurs	  over	  time	  and	  the	  loss	  of	  
experience	  should	  be	  addressed	  by	  the	  company	  in	  considering	  the	  
implementation	  of	  a	  process	  for	  maintaining	  corporate	  memory.	  	  	  
	  
Involving	  human	  resources	  
When	  a	  company	  is	  profitable,	  there	  is	  less	  likelihood	  that	  changes	  in	  
human	  resources	  will	  be	  significant	  and	  therefore	  any	  increase	  in	  
potential	  risk	  of	  the	  site	  will	  be	  limited.	  	  However,	  if	  a	  company	  is	  not	  
profitable,	  certain	  process	  areas	  may	  become	  isolated	  for	  a	  number	  of	  
reasons,	  such	  as	  managerial	  change	  that	  reduces	  attention	  on	  certain	  
parts	  of	  the	  plant	  more	  than	  others,	  or	  selling	  off	  of	  parts	  or	  processes	  
resulting	  in	  a	  loss	  of	  staff	  who	  may	  have	  important	  experience	  and	  
competency	  for	  the	  processes	  that	  remain.	  	  	  
Major	  organizational	  changes	  can	  have	  a	  substantial	  impact	  on	  risk	  
management	  and	  control	  of	  major	  hazards,	  and	  hence,	  in	  these	  
situations,	  there	  is	  often	  a	  need	  for	  the	  company	  to	  involve	  the	  human	  
resources	  department.	  	  	  The	  human	  resources	  department	  may	  be	  
important	  in	  assessing	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  change,	  projecting	  it	  out	  
over	  the	  short	  and	  medium-­‐term	  and	  communicating	  it	  to	  management	  
and	  other	  staff	  as	  might	  be	  appropriate.	  	  	  Culture	  can	  be	  positively	  or	  




negatively	  affected	  by	  a	  change.	  	  Sometimes	  culture	  may	  even	  
compensate	  for	  increased	  risk	  from	  organizational	  change.	  	  	  	  
The	  participants	  provided	  some	  examples	  of	  actual	  situations	  on	  Seveso	  
sites	  in	  which	  human	  resources	  staff	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  management	  
of	  change.	  	  	  For	  example,	  the	  competent	  authority	  advised	  that	  a	  lower-­‐
tier	  establishment	  should	  involve	  human	  resources	  in	  identifying	  safety	  
critical	  tasks	  and	  functions	  critical	  to	  emergency	  response.	  	  The	  human	  
resources	  staff	  were	  responsible	  for	  verifying	  that	  the	  change	  in	  
workload	  was	  manageable	  and	  realist.	  	  Hence,	  it	  became	  the	  job	  of	  
human	  resources	  staff	  to	  convince	  the	  inspector	  that	  the	  operator	  could	  
run	  the	  plant	  safely	  following	  the	  organizational	  change.	  	  	  
As	  another	  example,	  a	  high	  risk	  upper-­‐tier	  establishment	  went	  into	  
liquidation.	  The	  competent	  authority	  informed	  the	  operator	  that	  the	  
regulator	  intended	  to	  assess	  how	  the	  new	  management	  would	  cope	  
with	  the	  start-­‐up	  of	  a	  new	  plant	  while	  downsizing.	  The	  site	  dealt	  with	  
managing	  human	  resources	  using	  human	  factors	  guidance	  and	  tools	  
created	  by	  the	  UK	  Health	  and	  Safety	  Executive	  addressing	  the	  risk	  of	  
fatigue	  (http://www.hse.gov.uk/humanfactors/topics/specific2.pdf)	  .	  	  
The	  regulator	  made	  no	  objection	  to	  the	  start-­‐up	  of	  the	  new	  plant	  since	  
the	  operator	  had	  documented	  how	  the	  site	  would	  assure	  that	  the	  
assigned	  workloads	  and	  competences	  were	  appropriate.	  	  
A	  change	  in	  the	  shift	  pattern	  was	  also	  noted	  by	  participants	  as	  a	  
particular	  challenging	  human	  resources	  issue	  with	  a	  potentially	  high	  
learning	  curve.	  	  
	  
Defining	  and	  demonstrating	  success	  
Common	  success	  factors	  
• Size	  of	  the	  company.	  	  Small,	  simply	  structured	  companies	  with	  
a	  limited	  number	  of	  hazardous	  substances	  and	  processes	  may	  
have	  very	  few	  significant	  changes	  in	  the	  whole	  lifetime	  of	  the	  
company.	  	  However,	  they	  should	  be	  attentive	  to	  change	  
events,	  few	  as	  they	  may	  be,	  that	  could	  affect	  their	  process	  
risks.	  	  For	  example,	  a	  small	  site	  that	  does	  not	  pay	  attention	  to	  




aging	  factors	  or	  potential	  impacts	  of	  maintenance	  changes	  
could	  be	  still	  quite	  vulnerable	  to	  accident	  risks.	  
• Complexity	  and	  severity	  of	  risk.	  	  Complexity	  and	  severity	  are	  
often	  correlated	  with	  size.	  	  As	  sites	  increase	  in	  size,	  they	  can	  
accommodate	  larger	  volumes	  of	  substances	  and	  more	  
processes.	  	  Other	  enterprises	  may	  by	  their	  nature	  have	  rapidly	  
changing	  processes	  and	  chemicals	  (for	  example,	  batch	  
processors)	  and	  thus	  “Management	  of	  Change”	  is	  an	  essential	  
aspect	  of	  doing	  business.	  
• Clear	  and	  correct	  definition	  of	  safety	  relevant	  changes.	  	  One	  of	  
the	  greatest	  challenges	  of	  management	  of	  change	  is	  
recognizing	  a	  safety	  relevant	  change.	  The	  definition	  should	  
take	  account	  of	  organizational,	  personnel	  and	  technical	  
changes,	  including	  progressive	  change	  and	  temporary	  changes.	  
• Clear	  procedures	  for	  assessing	  risks	  associated	  with	  change.	  	  
The	  risk	  assessment	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  activities	  
within	  the	  MoC	  process.	  It	  is	  critical	  to	  involve	  personnel	  who	  
have	  experience	  and	  are	  knowledgeable	  about	  the	  process	  or	  
processes	  affected	  by	  the	  change.	  	  The	  risk	  assessment	  should	  
be	  proportionate	  to	  the	  dimension	  or	  complexity	  of	  the	  
change.	  For	  example,	  more	  sophisticated	  risk	  assessment	  tools,	  
such	  as	  event	  trees,	  failure	  mode	  effects	  analysis,	  or	  other	  
models	  should	  be	  applied	  to	  changes	  that	  are	  particularly	  
significant,	  or	  that	  could	  have	  potentially	  multidimensional	  
impacts.	  
• Attention	  to	  control	  of	  temporary	  changes.	  	  	  Temporary	  
changes	  should	  be	  managed	  to	  ensure	  they	  are	  not	  forgotten	  
and	  become	  permanent	  by	  default.	  	  The	  safety	  management	  
system	  should	  impose	  specific	  controls	  in	  this	  regard,	  such	  as	  
requiring	  a	  mandatory	  expiration	  date,	  fixed	  intervals	  for	  
checking	  their	  integrity,	  or	  higher	  level	  attention	  (e.g.,	  
management	  report)	  when	  they	  are	  in	  a	  place	  beyond	  a	  certain	  
time	  limit.	  	  	  Without	  such	  controls,	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  that	  after	  a	  




period	  of	  time	  the	  change	  is	  not	  reversed	  and	  the	  original	  
problem	  resurfaces.	  	  
• Documentation	  of	  change	  and	  maintenance	  of	  corporate	  
memory.	  	  Precise	  information	  on	  changes	  should	  be	  recorded	  
in	  all	  relevant	  documentation,	  process	  plans,	  diagrammes,	  and	  
operational	  procedures,	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  is	  clear	  why	  a	  
particular	  modification	  was	  made.	  	  Results	  of	  the	  risk	  
assessment	  of	  the	  change	  and	  recommended	  control	  measures	  
should	  be	  documented	  and	  included	  in	  other	  relevant	  
documentation,	  including	  operating	  procedures	  and	  the	  safety	  
report.	  	  	  
	  
What	  does	  success	  look	  like?	  
• Within	  the	  policy	  of	  the	  company	  a	  safety	  relevant	  change	  is	  
clearly	  defined.	  
• The	  MoC	  process	  has	  a	  systematic	  hazard	  identification	  and	  
evaluation	  process.	  
• MoC	  procedures	  are	  known	  by	  all	  personnel	  and	  applied	  
systematically.	  
• Initiated	  changes	  are	  tracked	  all	  the	  way	  through	  to	  close-­‐out	  
and	  all	  changes	  are	  documented	  in	  procedures,	  piping	  and	  
instrumentation	  diagrammes	  (P&ID),	  etc.	  
• Temporary	  changes	  are	  closed	  out	  and	  do	  not	  become	  
permanent	  by	  default.	  
• Responsibilities	  are	  defined	  for	  initiating	  and	  authorising	  
changes	  as	  well	  as	  approval	  on	  completion.	  










3.4 MONITORING	  PERFORMANCE,	  AUDIT	  AND	  REVIEW	  
Whether	  the	  company	  has	  an	  audit	  team	  for	  process	  safety	  (at	  
company	  or	  corporate	  level)	  is	  one	  of	  the	  key	  questions	  for	  the	  
assessment	  of	  the	  SMS	  suitability	  for	  monitoring,	  auditing	  and	  
reviewing	  performance.	  The	  team	  should	  have	  responsibility	  for	  
planning	  and	  conducting	  audits,	  setting	  audit	  intervals,	  determining	  the	  
content	  of	  the	  audit	  and	  ensuring	  that	  actions	  are	  tracked.	  	  Of	  
importance	  is	  that	  the	  audit	  team	  is	  independent	  of	  the	  operations	  
section	  which	  is	  being	  audited.	  	  	  
Sometimes	  a	  company	  will	  not	  have	  a	  formal	  audit	  or	  monitoring	  
system	  but	  other	  audits	  and	  routine	  offer	  feedback	  on	  safety	  
performance.	  	  For	  example,	  sometimes	  data	  collected	  for	  other	  
purposes	  (e.g.,	  quality	  control)	  may	  contain	  data	  relevant	  to	  safety	  
performance.	  	  Some	  sites	  may	  include	  these	  data	  as	  part	  of	  the	  
monitoring	  and	  feedback	  system.	  	  Audits	  that	  have	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  
prevention	  of	  major	  accidents	  may	  also	  be	  relevant,	  but	  the	  Seveso	  
inspector	  should	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  differences	  and	  limitations	  of	  ISO	  
certification	  audits,	  internal	  audits,	  and	  insurance	  audits	  as	  opposed	  to	  
process	  safety	  specific	  audits.	  
The	  role	  played	  by	  Seveso-­‐inspectors	  in	  raising	  awareness	  of	  the	  top-­‐
level	  management	  for	  the	  need	  to	  monitor	  and	  evaluate	  safety	  
performance	  and	  to	  provide	  resources	  to	  do	  so	  is	  possibly	  significant.	  
Questions	  that	  inspectors	  can	  pose	  that	  address	  the	  roles	  played	  by	  the	  
company	  management	  include:	  	  
• How	  does	  the	  company	  monitor	  its	  safety	  performance?	  	  Have	  
the	  figures	  changed?	  If	  so,	  why?	  	  It	  is	  important	  that	  the	  
management	  shows	  commitment	  to	  monitoring	  performance	  
and	  that	  practical	  follow-­‐up	  takes	  place	  and	  is	  not	  just	  looking	  
at	  figures.	  	  
• Are	  near-­‐miss	  reporting	  procedures	  and	  processes	  in	  place	  to	  
make	  use	  of	  the	  opportunity	  to	  learn?	  	  




• Do	  processes	  for	  collecting	  and	  assessing	  improvement	  
proposals	  by	  staff	  exist?	  
• Does	  a	  positive	  failure	  culture	  exist	  (is	  failure	  an	  opportunity	  
for	  improvement	  or	  punishment)?	  
• Are	  aspects	  of	  a	  learning	  organization	  part	  of	  the	  performance	  
monitoring,	  audit	  and	  review	  processes?	  
• Are	  there	  regular	  meetings	  to	  follow-­‐up	  on	  incidents?	  
• Are	  maintenance	  tasks	  on	  schedule	  or	  are	  they	  lagging	  behind?	  
• Is	  training	  up-­‐to	  date	  and	  appropriate?	  
• Does	  the	  company	  use	  checklists	  and	  if	  so,	  are	  they	  
appropriate?	  	  How	  often	  are	  they	  reviewed?	  Where	  companies	  
use	  checklists	  to	  assist	  them	  in	  their	  review	  inspectors	  should	  
ask	  whether	  they	  are	  appropriate	  and	  how	  often	  the	  checklists	  
are	  reviewed.	  
• Is	  the	  lack	  of	  accidents	  and	  near-­‐misses	  over	  a	  period	  of	  time	  
appropriate?	  	  	  
• What	  is	  the	  quality	  and	  systematic	  approach	  to	  following-­‐up	  on	  
accidents	  and	  near	  misses?	  
• How	  are	  near-­‐misses	  taken	  into	  account?	  	  	  
• How	  does	  the	  company	  follow	  up	  on	  recommendations	  from	  
the	  competent	  authority,	  from	  internal	  audits	  and	  others?	  
For	  the	  question	  of	  audit	  and	  review,	  the	  inspector	  should	  try	  to	  
understand	  how	  plant	  safety	  is	  integrated	  into	  the	  existing	  system	  of	  
evaluating	  company	  performance,	  e.g.	  annual	  review.	  	  This	  process	  
should	  be	  a	  documented	  procedure	  and	  note	  should	  be	  taken	  of	  the	  
role	  of	  a	  parent	  company	  or	  corporation	  where	  existing.	  	  	  Some	  but	  not	  
all	  participants	  doubted	  as	  to	  whether	  inspectors	  could	  gain	  a	  valuable	  
perspective	  with	  regard	  to	  plant	  and	  process	  safety	  from	  external	  
certification	  such	  as	  ISO	  14000.	  
	  





Special	  considerations	  for	  different	  types	  of	  sites	  
Upper-­‐tier	  sites	  
Inspectors	  experience	  that	  large	  companies	  complain	  about	  the	  number	  
and	  frequency	  of	  audits.	  	  Moreover,	  inspectors	  are	  not	  always	  certain	  
that	  there	  is	  an	  appropriate	  level	  of	  involvement	  of	  management.	  	  
Audits	  should	  be	  reviewed	  by	  the	  top	  management	  and	  the	  efficiency	  of	  
measures	  should	  be	  monitored.	  	  Performance	  can	  be	  monitored	  using	  
indicators,	  and	  here	  the	  focus	  should	  be	  on	  leading	  indicators.	  
However,	  it	  is	  a	  challenge	  to	  have	  a	  clear	  picture	  of	  what	  an	  indicator	  
system	  should	  look	  like	  in	  different	  settings,	  such	  that	  it	  is	  a	  challenge	  to	  
assess	  whether	  the	  indicator	  system	  is	  sufficient.	  	  	  
Some	  strategies	  for	  Seveso	  inspectors	  in	  assessing	  whether	  the	  SMS	  is	  
adequately	  monitored	  include:	  
• Seveso	  inspector	  should	  ask	  questions	  about	  the	  structure	  and	  
process	  of	  internal	  and	  external	  audits	  and	  reviews	  and	  check	  their	  
implementation.	  
• The	  Seveso	  inspector	  should	  question	  why	  a	  particular	  indicator	  has	  
been	  chosen	  –	  what	  is	  the	  company	  expecting	  from	  the	  indicator,	  
what	  is	  its	  purpose?	  	  
• The	  Seveso	  inspector	  should	  check	  whether	  the	  company	  has	  
performance	  indicators	  for	  the	  critical	  parts	  of	  the	  SMS,	  such	  as	  
management	  of	  change,	  maintenance,	  permits,	  etc.	  
	  
Lower-­‐tier	  sites	  and	  small	  and	  medium-­‐size	  enterprises	  
It	  was	  recognized	  that	  achieving	  effective	  monitoring	  of	  performance	  
and	  carrying	  out	  audits	  and	  review	  can	  be	  a	  substantial	  challenge	  in	  
SMEs	  and	  many	  lower-­‐tier	  sites.	  This	  situation	  arises	  often	  due	  to	  their	  
size	  and	  also	  in	  part	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  resources	  or	  a	  failure	  to	  appreciate	  
the	  importance	  and	  value	  of	  having	  regular	  feedback	  on	  safety	  
strengths	  and	  weaknesses.	  	  Many	  SMEs	  may	  have	  no	  internal	  or	  




external	  audit	  system	  and	  the	  Seveso	  inspection	  is	  possibly	  their	  only	  
“process	  safety	  audit”.	  	  In	  fact,	  for	  many	  SMEs	  business	  operations	  are	  
decided	  on	  a	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  basis	  and	  not	  seen	  as	  part	  of	  a	  systematic	  
process.	  
In	  general	  it	  is	  recommended	  that	  small	  companies	  have	  external	  audits	  
so	  that	  internal	  bias	  does	  not	  interfere	  with	  important	  learnings	  and	  
recommendations.	  	  	  
Important	  questions	  for	  an	  inspector	  to	  ask	  are	  therefore:	  	  
• Does	  the	  company	  have	  an	  audit	  process?	  	  	  
• Does	  the	  company	  follow	  its	  safety	  performance	  with	  a	  process	  
in	  place	  to	  receive	  and	  review	  feedback	  regularly?	  
• Does	  the	  company	  follow-­‐up	  and	  ensure	  that	  established	  
control	  measures	  to	  maintain	  plant	  and	  process	  safety	  are	  
implemented	  and	  continuing	  to	  function	  as	  intended?	  	  The	  
inspector	  might	  also	  seek	  to	  verify	  control	  measures	  in	  
practice.	  	  	  
Examples	  of	  control	  measures	  could	  include	  good	  housekeeping	  
(e.g.,	  tidy	  and	  clean	  premises,	  appropriate	  clean-­‐up	  of	  waste	  and	  
minor	  spills,	  etc.),	  records	  of	  the	  maintenance	  of	  safety	  equipment	  
such	  as	  gas	  detectors	  and	  alarms,	  posting	  of	  operating	  instructions	  
and	  safety	  precautions,	  explicit	  signage	  in	  regard	  to	  what	  is	  not	  
permitted	  (no	  smoking,	  entry	  for	  authorized	  personnel	  only,	  etc.).	  
	  
Important	  considerations	  
Safety	  performance	  indicators	  
Many	  participants	  noted	  that	  the	  inspection	  should	  include	  a	  review	  of	  
the	  quality	  of	  the	  safety	  performance	  indicators,	  if	  the	  company	  
formally	  maintains	  such	  a	  feedback	  system.	  	  	  They	  offered	  a	  number	  of	  
suggestions	  to	  inspectors	  on	  evaluating	  such	  systems	  as	  part	  of	  SMS	  
inspection:	  




• The	  company	  must	  use	  indicators	  based	  on	  its	  own	  operations	  
and	  experience	  with	  them.	  	  Hence,	  the	  operator	  should	  be	  able	  
to	  explain	  to	  the	  inspector	  as	  to	  why	  they	  are	  considered	  
effective	  indicators	  for	  the	  site.	  Inspectors	  should	  also	  question	  
why	  the	  companies	  have	  chosen	  particular	  topics	  for	  indicators	  
and	  how	  the	  management	  has	  determined	  that	  they	  are	  
important.	  
• Inspection	  of	  the	  SMS	  should	  be	  based	  on	  more	  than	  just	  the	  
output	  from	  the	  indicators.	  	  Qualitative	  feedback,	  e.g.,	  from	  
audits,	  occurrence	  of	  near	  misses	  and	  accidents,	  should	  also	  be	  
regularly	  reported	  with	  lessons	  and	  recommendations	  
extracted	  and	  incorporated	  into	  the	  safety	  management	  
system.	  	  	  	  
• Companies	  should	  report	  on	  competency	  and	  training	  in	  their	  
indicators.	  	  Several	  examples	  of	  measures	  of	  training	  are	  
provided	  in	  various	  guidance	  documents	  that	  have	  been	  
published	  by	  industry	  and	  government	  on	  safety	  performance	  
indicators.	  	  	  
• Are	  the	  right	  questions	  being	  asked?	  When	  collecting	  data	  on	  
near	  misses	  a	  high	  collection	  rate	  should	  make	  the	  operator	  
proud,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  early	  stage	  of	  the	  programme.	  There	  is	  a	  
need	  to	  compare	  smaller	  incidents	  (near	  misses)	  to	  the	  
number	  of	  accidents.	  	  
• The	  quality	  of	  the	  analysis	  of	  feedback	  is	  important.	  	  To	  
evaluate	  analytical	  quality,	  inspectors	  can	  inquire	  about	  the	  
analytical	  process,	  e.g.,	  who	  performs	  the	  analysis,	  the	  
methods	  used,	  and	  how	  feedback	  is	  selected	  for	  analysis	  (for	  
example,	  if	  a	  dataset	  is	  large	  or	  certain	  data	  are	  generated	  
continuously).	  	  They	  may	  also	  ask	  to	  see	  an	  example	  of	  a	  report	  
summarising	  results	  of	  an	  analysis	  and	  associated	  
recommendations	  for	  follow-­‐up.	  
	  
	  




Responsibility	  for	  the	  SMS	  
Responsibility	  for	  the	  SMS	  should	  be	  distributed	  over	  a	  number	  of	  
positions	  within	  the	  management	  chain,	  i.e.,	  operational	  staff,	  middle	  
and	  top	  management.	  	  Responsibility	  should	  involve	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  
line	  management	  and	  there	  should	  be	  a	  process	  embedded	  in	  the	  SMS	  
to	  check	  periodically	  that	  assigned	  personnel	  understand	  and	  are	  
performing	  the	  tasks	  allocated	  in	  a	  competent	  and	  timely	  manner.	  
It	  may	  be	  that	  a	  small	  site	  might	  have	  one	  person	  responsible	  for	  the	  
SMS,	  but	  for	  most	  sites	  it	  is	  not	  recommended.	  	  Involving	  key	  
management	  and	  staff	  ensures	  a	  shared	  ownership	  of	  the	  SMS.	  	  In	  the	  
case,	  where	  responsibility	  is	  concentrated	  in	  one	  person,	  the	  SMS	  is	  
often	  taken	  less	  seriously.	  	  It	  has	  been	  observed	  that	  other	  staff	  even	  
feel	  that	  the	  person	  who	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  SMS	  is	  someone	  
“without	  a	  proper	  job”,	  and	  as	  a	  consequence	  the	  person	  and	  position	  
has	  a	  low	  standing	  within	  the	  company.	  The	  Seveso	  inspector	  should	  be	  
prepared	  to	  raise	  this	  issue	  as	  a	  potential	  problem	  with	  site	  
management,	  raising	  awareness	  in	  regard	  to	  better	  strategies	  that	  
optimize	  the	  use	  of	  staff	  resources	  in	  areas	  relevant	  to	  their	  
competence	  and	  responsibilities	  in	  order	  to	  make	  the	  SMS	  a	  dynamic	  
and	  “living”	  part	  of	  site	  operations.	  	  	  
	  
Defining	  and	  demonstrating	  success	  
Common	  success	  factors	  
• Focus	  on	  relevant	  processes	  and	  functions.	  	  The	  audit	  should	  be	  
targeted	  to	  those	  aspects	  of	  operations	  that	  which	  influence	  
major	  accident	  prevention	  and	  preparedness.	  	  The	  audit	  
process	  should	  be	  also	  based	  on	  a	  clear	  understanding	  of	  the	  
role	  of	  studied	  activities	  in	  safety	  performance	  and	  their	  
performance	  expectations.	  
• Availability	  of	  resources.	  	  Effectiveness	  of	  an	  audit	  is	  also	  a	  
function	  of	  resource	  constraints.	  	  The	  use	  of	  trained	  and	  
experienced	  auditors,	  as	  well	  as	  making	  adequate	  time	  for	  the	  
audit,	  will	  determine	  the	  credibility	  and	  reliability	  of	  the	  final	  




results.	  	  When	  internal	  audits	  are	  outsourced,	  the	  quality	  of	  
the	  outcome	  will	  depend	  on	  having	  adequate	  funding	  to	  buy	  
the	  necessary	  time	  and	  competence	  to	  perform	  the	  task	  
properly.	  
• Management	  commitment.	  	  A	  successful	  audit	  requires	  
support	  from	  management	  throughout	  all	  phases,	  particularly	  
to	  ensure	  that	  action	  items	  generated	  from	  the	  audit	  are	  
adequately	  addressed.	  	  	  A	  constructive	  management	  attitude	  
also	  encourages	  a	  level	  of	  attention	  and	  rigour,	  improving	  the	  
quality	  of	  the	  audit.	  	  	  
• Quality	  of	  audits	  and	  monitoring.	  	  Audits	  themselves	  should	  
require	  performance	  standards.	  	  Criteria	  for	  judging	  the	  quality	  
of	  an	  audit	  include:	  
o evidence	  of	  procedures	  for	  controlling	  risks,	  	  
o evaluation	  of	  how	  successfully	  procedures	  have	  been	  
implemented,	  	  
o evaluation	  of	  effectiveness	  of	  procedures	  achieving	  
safety	  performance	  targets	  (if	  appropriate),	  
o evidence	  of	  procedures	  to	  identify	  and	  reduce	  
problems,	  
o observations	  on	  non-­‐conformities	  and	  substandard	  
practices,	  
o observations	  highlighting	  examples	  of	  good	  practice.	  
• Appropriate	  selection	  of	  process	  safety	  performance	  criteria	  
and	  indicators.	  	  There	  is	  considerable	  guidance	  available	  on	  
selection	  of	  performance	  monitoring	  criteria,	  particularly	  for	  
safety	  performance	  indicators.	  	  Some	  characteristics	  that	  
should	  be	  considered	  include	  :	  
o Tangibility	  (able	  to	  communicate	  a	  tangible	  measure	  
of	  performance,	  either	  qualitative	  or	  numeric)	  ,	  




o Validity	  (has	  validity	  as	  a	  safety	  performance	  
measure),	  
o Reliability	  (gives	  consistent	  feedback	  on	  the	  same	  
underlying	  conditions)	  ,	  
o Sensitivity	  (can	  detect	  changes	  in	  time	  for	  corrective	  
action),	  
o Transparency	  (is	  readily	  understandable	  by	  users).	  
• Use	  of	  findings	  to	  drive	  improvement.	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  a	  
process	  safety	  audit	  is	  to	  provide	  feedback	  into	  the	  SMS	  
system	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  The	  feedback	  goes	  beyond	  a	  qualitative	  
evaluation	  of	  safety	  performance;	  it	  presents	  insights	  into	  
deficiencies	  in	  the	  safety	  management	  system.	  	  The	  audit	  
findings	  should	  normally	  include	  recommendations	  for	  
immediate	  corrective	  actions	  but	  also	  recommendations	  to	  
explore	  address	  potentially	  systemic	  problems.	  
	  
What	  does	  success	  look	  like?	  
In	  identifying	  success	  the	  inspector	  needs	  to	  look	  for	  	  
• Evidence,	  via	  documentation,	  observation	  and	  interviews,	  that	  
the	  appropriate	  behaviours	  and	  activities	  have	  taken	  place	  
within	  the	  company.	  	  
• Senior	  management	  views	  the	  audit	  as	  an	  important	  activity	  
contributing	  to	  continuous	  improvement	  rather	  than	  just	  a	  
compliance	  activity.	  
• Management	  is	  involved	  in	  meetings	  to	  prepare	  for	  audits	  and	  
discuss	  results	  and	  follow-­‐up.	  
• The	  audit	  process	  completes	  the	  entire	  feedback	  loop	  of	  the	  
so-­‐called	  Deming-­‐Cycle,	  i.e.,	  Plan-­‐Do-­‐Check	  Act	  completed.	  
• All	  elements	  of	  the	  SMS	  are	  reviewed	  and	  results	  of	  the	  audit	  
are	  fed	  back	  into	  the	  SMS	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	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Name	   Organization	   City	   State	  
	   	   	   	  
Gerhard	  Grafeneder	   Styrian	  Government	   Graz	   Austria	  
Alfred	  Moser	   Magistrat	  der	  Landeshauptstadt	  Linz	  -­‐	  Österreich	   Linz	   Austria	  
Paul	  De	  Bruyn	   Total	  Petrochemicals	  /	  EPSC	   Brussels	   Belgium	  
Michiel	  Goethals	   Chemical	  risks	  directorate,	  FPS	  Employment,	  Labour	  ans	  
Social	  Dialogue	  
Brussels	   Belgium	  
Nele	  Loos	   LNE	  Afdeling	  Mileu-­‐Inspectie	   Zandhoven	   Belgium	  
Miljenka	  Klicek	   Ministry	  of	  Environmental	  Protection,	  Physical	  Planning	  and	  
Construction	  
Zagreb	   Croatia	  
Themistoclis	  Kyriacou	   Department	  of	  Labour	   Nicosia	   Cyprus	  
Zuzana	  Machatova	   Ministry	  of	  the	  Environment	  of	  the	  Czech	  Republik	   Praha	   Czech	  Republik	  
Sirje	  Arus	   Estonian	  Technical	  Surveillance	  Authority	   Tallinn	   Estonia	  
Anne-­‐Mari	  Lähde	   TUKES	  (SafetyTechnology	  Authority)	   Tampere	   Finland	  
Mirja	  Palmen	   TUKES	  (SafetyTechnology	  Authority)	   Tampere	   Finland	  
Julie	  Arnaud	   French	  Ministry	  of	  Environment	  (Regional	  Organization)	   Le	  Havre	   France	  




Klaus-­‐Jürgen	  Niemitz	   Clariant	  Produkte	  (Deutschland)	  GmbH	  /	  EPSC	   Sulzbach/Ts	   Germany	  
Birgit	  Richter	   Landesamt	  für	  Natur,	  Umwelt	  und	  Verbraucherschutz	  NRW	  
(LANUV	  NRW)	  	  
Recklinghausen	   Germany	  
Eszter	  Taskó-­‐Szilágyi	   National	  Directorate	  General	  for	  Disaster	  Management	   Budapest	   Hungary	  
Fridrik	  Danielsson	   Vinnueftirlitid	  (Administration	  of	  Occupational	  Safety	  and	  
Health)	  
Reykjavik	   Iceland	  
Ita	  Daly	   Health	  &	  Safety	  Authority,	  Ireland	   Cork	   Ireland	  
Francesco	  Astorri	   ISPRA-­‐Italy	   Rome	   Italy	  
Arne	  Johan	  Thorsen	   Petroleum	  Safety	  Authority	  Norway	   Stavanger	   Norway	  
Ariadna	  Koniuch	   National	  Headquarters	  of	  the	  State	  Fire	  Service	   Warsaw	   Poland	  
Slawomir	  Zajac	   National	  Headquarters	  of	  the	  State	  Fire	  Service	   Warsaw	   Poland	  
Elsa	  Albuquerque	   Inspecção	  Geral	  do	  Ambiente	  e	  do	  Ordenamento	  do	  
Território	  (IGAOT)	  
Lisboa	   Portugal	  
Maria	  João	  Rebelo	  
Santos	  
Agência	  Portuguesa	  doAmbiente	  /	  Portuguese	  Environmenr	  
Agency	  
Amadora	   Portugal	  
Carmen	  Miclea	   National	  Environmental	  Guard	  -­‐	  Prahova	  County	  
Commissariat	  
Prahova	   Romani	  
Juliana	  Knazovická	   Slovak	  inspektorate	  of	  the	  Environment	   Banska	  Bystrica	   Slovakia	  
Dragica	  Hrzica	   Ministry	  of	  environment	  and	  spatial	  planning,	  Inspectorate	  
of	  RS	  for	  the	  environment	  and	  spatial	  planning	  
Celje	   Slovenia	  
Claes	  Petersén	   Swedish	  Work	  Environment	  Authority	   Falun	   Sweden	  
Martin	  Wänerholm	   Västmanland	  County	  Administrative	  Board	   Västerås	   Sweden	  
86	   Assessment	  of	  Safety	  Management	  Systems	  of	  Major	  Hazard	  Sites	  
	  
	  
Wilco	  Renema	   Dutch	  Labour	  Inspectorate	   Utrecht	   The	  Netherlands	  
Jan	  (Johannes,	  H.G.)	  
Slijpen	  
Ministry	  of	  Social	  Affairs	  and	  Employment	  /	  Dutch	  Labour	  
Inspectorate	  
Utrecht	   The	  Netherlands	  
Simone	  Wiers	   Ministry	  of	  Social	  Affairs	  and	  Welfare	   The	  Hague	   The	  Netherlands	  
Ayse	  Pinar	  Aklan	   Ministry	  of	  Environment	  and	  Forestry	   Ankara	   Turkey	  





Name	   Organization	   City	  	   State	  
Dagmar	  Dräger	   Regierungspräsidium	  Darmstadt	  	   Frankfurt	  am	  Main	  	   Germany	  
Anita	  Becker	   Regierungspräsidium	  Darmstadt	   Frankfurt	  am	  Main	  	   Germany	  
Ralf	  Schröder	   Regierungspräsidium	  Darmstadt	   Frankfurt	  am	  Main	  	   Germany	  
Hans-­‐Peter	  Ziegenfuß	   Regierungspräsidium	  Darmstadt	   Frankfurt	  am	  Main	  	   Germany	  
Anne-­‐Barbara	  Furness	   Regierungspräsidium	  Darmstadt	   Wiesbaden	  	   Germany	  
Annette	  Stumpf	   Regierungspräsidium	  Darmstadt	   Wiesbaden	  	   Germany	  
Mark	  Hailwood	   Landesananstalt	  für	  Umwelt,	  Messungen	  und	  Naturschutz	  
Baden-­‐Württemberg	  
Karlsruhe	  	   Germany	  
Begoña	  Hermann	   Struktur-­‐	  und	  Genehmigungsdirektion	  Nord	  Rheinland-­‐Pflaz	   Trier	  	   Germany	  
Maureen	  Wood	   MAHB,	  EC-­‐JRC	   Ispra	   European	  Commission	  
	  
	  





ANNEX	  3:	  PROGRAMME	  OF	  THE	  WORKSHOP	  
	  
	   Wednesday,	  27	  October	  2010	  
	  
Time	   	   Speaker	  
12:00	   Registration	  /	  Lunch	  
13:00	   Conference	  Opening	   Mr	  Freund	  
State	  Ministry	  for	  Environment,	  Energy,	  Agriculture	  and	  Consumer	  
Protection	  Hesse,	  Germany	  
	  
Mrs	  Maureen	  Wood	  
European	  Commission,	  Joint	  Research	  Centre,	  Ispra,	  Italy	  
	  
Mr	  Baron	  
Regional	  President	  Darmstadt,	  Hesse,	  Germany	  
	   Organization	  /	  Information	   Mrs	  Dagmar	  Dräger	  
RP	  Darmstadt,	  Hesse,	  Germany	  
	   Session	  I	  
Introduction	  and	  Definitions	  
13:30	   Safety	  Management	  Systems	  (SMS)	  –	  General	  
Requirements	  and	  Safety	  Performance	  Indicators	  
Mr	  Mark	  Hailwood	  
State	  Institute	  for	  Environment,	  Monitoring	  and	  Nature	  Conservation	  
Baden-­‐Württemberg,	  Germany	  
14:00	   SMS	  -­‐	  Assessment	  of	  Effectiveness	   Dr	  Peter	  Schmelzer	  
Bayer	  HealthCare	  
88	   Assessment	  of	  Safety	  Management	  Systems	  of	  Major	  Hazard	  Sites	  
	  
	  
14:30	   Safety	  Culture	  and	  Safety	  Leadership	   Mrs	  Maureen	  Wood	  
European	  Commission,	  Joint	  Research	  Centre	  
15:00	   Coffee	  
	   Session	  II	  
SMS	  Impact	  on	  Accidents	  
Time	   	   Speaker	  
15:30	   In	  this	  session	  six	  presentations	  are	  given	  covering	  
accidents	  in	  the	  Member	  States	  where	  deficiencies	  
in	  the	  SMS	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  
accident	  or	  the	  extent	  of	  its	  effects.	  The	  aim	  is	  to	  
highlight	  the	  relevance	  of	  safety	  management	  
within	  the	  prevention	  of	  major	  accidents.	  	  
• NOx	  accident	  Netherlands,	  Jan	  Slijpen	  	  
• Changing	  a	  hose	  coupling	  led	  to	  an	  
explosion,	  Claes	  Petersén	  	  
• Release	  of	  carbon	  monoxide	  leading	  to	  a	  
fatal	  accident,	  Birgit	  Richter	  	  
• Carbon	  disulphide	  tank	  explosion,	  Anne-­‐Mari	  
Lähde	  	  
• Explosion	  of	  a	  sulfuric	  acid	  tank,	  Julie	  Arnaud	  	  
• Dead	  contractors	  after	  TiCl4	  release,	  Michiel	  
Goethals	  
Moderation:	  
Mrs	  Anne-­‐Barbara	  Furness	  
RP	  Darmstadt	  
17.30	   Explanation	  of	  the	  working	  groups	   	  
	  





	   Thursday,	  28	  October	  2010	  
	  
Time	   	   	  
	   Workshops	  in	  3	  parallel	  working	  groups:	  
What	  questions	  need	  to	  be	  asked	  by	  inspectors	  when	  determining	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  a	  safety	  management	  system?	  
Considering:	  	  
• the	  requirements	  of	  Annex	  III,	  Seveso	  II	  Directive	  [96/82/EC]	  	  
• the	  specific	  situation	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  complexity	  of	  operation	  and	  the	  risks	  presented	  by:	  	  
1. Small	  and	  Medium-­‐sized	  Enterprises	  (SMEs),	  	  
2. Large	  scale	  enterprises	  and	  corporations	  (upper-­‐tier)	  	  
3. Large	  scale	  enterprises	  and	  corporations	  (lower-­‐tier)	  
Each	  group	  should	  spend	  ca.	  60	  minutes	  discussing	  the	  individual	  topics.	  Following	  this,	  each	  group	  will	  have	  ca.	  10	  minutes	  
to	  present	  their	  results	  in	  plenary	  followed	  by	  a	  30	  minute	  plenary	  discussion.	  
Each	  group	  will	  cover	  one	  of	  the	  industry	  groupings	  listed	  above.	  A	  list	  of	  guide	  questions	  to	  channel	  and	  orientate	  the	  
thought	  processes	  for	  each	  topic	  will	  be	  provided.	  
The	  groups	  should	  develop	  sets	  of	  questions	  suitable	  for	  assessing	  the	  SMS	  workshop	  topic	  (from	  Seveso	  II,	  Annex	  III).	  
The	  groups	  should	  provide	  an	  indication	  of	  typical	  expectations	  for	  the	  answers	  to	  these	  questions,	  which	  demonstrate	  
adequate	  compliance	  with	  the	  re-­‐quirements	  of	  Annex	  III.	  	  
	  
09:00	   Workshop	  I:	  Organization	  and	  Personnel	  
Group	  work	  
	  
10:00	   3	  x	  group	  presentations	  	  
1. Small	  and	  Medium-­‐sized	  Enterprises	  (SMEs)	  	  
2. Large	  scale	  enterprises	  and	  corporations	  (upper-­‐tier)	  	  
3. Large	  scale	  enterprises	  and	  corporations	  (lower-­‐tier)	  	  
	  




10:30	   Plenary	  discussion	   	  
11:00	   Coffee	  
11:30	   Workshop	  II:	  Identification	  and	  Evaluation	  of	  Major	  Hazards	  and	  Risks	  
Group	  work	  
	  
12:30	   Lunch	  
13:30	   Workshop	  II	  continued:	  
3	  x	  group	  presentations	  	  
1. Small	  and	  Medium-­‐sized	  Enterprises	  (SMEs)	  	  
2. Large	  scale	  enterprises	  and	  corporations	  (upper-­‐tier)	  	  
3. Large	  scale	  enterprises	  and	  corporations	  (lower-­‐tier)	  	  
	  
	  
14:00	   Plenary	  discussion	   	  
14:30	   Workshop	  III:	  Management	  of	  Change	  
Group	  work	  
	  
15:30	   Coffee	  
16:00	   Workshop	  III	  continued:	  
3	  x	  group	  presentations	  	  
1. Small	  and	  Medium-­‐sized	  Enterprises	  (SMEs)	  	  
2. Large	  scale	  enterprises	  and	  corporations	  (upper-­‐tier)	  
3. Large	  scale	  enterprises	  and	  corporations	  (lower-­‐tier)	  
	  
	  
16:30	   Plenary	  discussion	   	  
17:00	   End	  of	  2nd	  day	  
	  





	   Friday,	  29	  October	  2010	  
	  
Time	   	   	  




10:00	   3	  x	  group	  presentations	  	  
1. Small	  and	  Medium-­‐sized	  Enterprises	  
(SMEs)	  	  
2. Large	  scale	  enterprises	  and	  
corporations	  (upper-­‐tier)	  	  




10:30	   Plenary	  discussion	   	  
11:00	   Coffee	  
11.30	   Summary	  of	  Workshop	  Results	  and	  Final	  Discussion	  	   Chair:	  Mrs	  Maureen	  Wood	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The	  safety	  management	  system	  is	  now	  considered	  a	  central	  component	  of	  
modern	  process	  safety	  management.	  	  With	  the	  entering	  into	  force	  of	  the	  
Seveso	  II	  Directive	  ,	  the	  EU	  Member	  States	  have	  ever	  since	  been	  required	  to	  
ensure	  that	  the	  operator	  of	  an	  establishment	  falling	  under	  the	  requirements	  of	  
the	  Directive	  draws	  up	  a	  policy	  for	  the	  prevention	  of	  major	  accidents.	  Public	  
authorities	  are	  required	  to	  carry	  out	  inspections	  of	  the	  establishments,	  
including	  the	  site’s	  organizational	  and	  managerial	  systems,	  and	  this	  latter	  
responsibility	  is	  normally	  executed	  through	  an	  audit	  of	  the	  SMS.	  Auditing	  the	  
SMS	  is	  a	  significant	  challenge	  for	  authority	  inspectors	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  	  
In	  particular,	  even	  when	  a	  logical	  audit	  system	  has	  been	  well-­‐defined	  by	  
authorities,	  substantial	  questions	  remain	  concerning	  how	  far	  to	  carry	  the	  logic,	  
how	  to	  recognize	  where	  important	  gaps	  are	  present,	  how	  to	  be	  confident	  that	  
implementation	  in	  practice	  with	  management	  claims,	  etc.	  For	  this	  reason,	  a	  
workshop	  for	  Seveso	  inspectors	  	  on	  this	  topic	  was	  organized	  in	  Fulda,	  Germany	  
in	  2010	  to	  share	  knowledge	  and	  experience	  among	  inspectors	  	  for	  use	  in	  	  
benchmarking	  good	  practice	  in	  inspection	  and	  control	  of	  SMS	  demonstrations.	  	  
This	  document	  summarizes	  the	  most	  important	  observations	  and	  conclusions	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